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After the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown, and many other incidents of police violence
that followed, the militarization of policing and the use of violence by police became the
subjects of contentious debate among the public, policymakers, and scholars. Research on
these subjects necessary to inform the debate has been lacking. This work examines the
causes and effects of police militarization in the United States. Specifically, I argue that
militarization is a response to perceived threat from minority racial groups, but the rela-
tionship between racial demographics and militarization is curvilinear. Militarized begin
to see themselves as soldiers fighting on the front line of a war rather than public servants,
which causes goal divergence between the public and police. Although the public expects
police to only use lethal force in extreme circumstances, militarized police use lethal force
against civilians more quickly, resulting in more civilian deaths. Police departments should
respond to more frequent civilian deaths by implementing policy solutions, such as body-
worn cameras, that theoretically allow for easier monitoring of police behavior and over-
come the principal-agent problem.
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InAugust, 2014, a police officer in Ferguson, MO, outside St. Louis, shot and killed 18
year old Michael Brown, who was unarmed and reportedly had his hands in the air when
the officer shot him multiple times (“Angry crowd gathers after Missouri police shoot teen”
2014). Protesters took to the streets after the shooting to demonstrate their disapproval of
what they seemed to believe was an incident of excessive force by a police officer. Later,
a grand jury refused to indict the officer for any crimes (Desmond-Harris and Lind 2014).
Even now, five years later, the details of what precipitated the shooting remain unclear, but
the incident brought the topics of police militarization and use of force to the forefront of
public discussion. Michael Brown’s death inspired a national movement advocating police
reform (Sanburn 2014).
Other incidents of police officers killing civilians under questionable circumstances am-
plified and prolonged the controversy. Though they are, at this point, too numerous to name
each of them, it is worth recognizing several especially prominent victims of police vio-
lence. In North Charleston, SC, an officer initiated a traffic stop in April of 2015. The
driver was Walter Scott, driving a vehicle with a broken tail light. Scott ended up outside
of the vehicle; according to the video recording of a bystander, Scott tried to run from the
officer before the officer fired his weapon at Scott eight times. Scott died at the scene
(Shoichet and Cuevas 2015). In an unusual turn of events, the officer pleaded guilty to
violating Scott’s civil rights in federal court after a mistrial for murder in state court, and
received a 20-year sentence.
Also in April, 2015, Baltimore police arrested 25 year old Freddie Gray who ran from
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police on sight despite not facing any current charges. Somehow, between arrest and arrival
at the police station, he suffered severe spinal injuries that killed him several days later
(Graham 2015). All involved officers either received acquittals at trial or had their charges
dropped. The Justice Department refused to bring federal charges.
In March, 2018, police in Sacramento, CA, responded to a call of a suspect breaking
car windows and confronted a man initially spotted by a police helicopter. Stephon Clark,
22, tried to run but stopped quickly in the back yard of the house he stood near. Following
police orders, he raised both hands and turned around. One officer yelled that Clark had
a gun, and officers fired 20 shots at him. Eight hit, and Clark died on the scene. He was
holding an iPhone in one hand, which police mistook for a gun (Chavez, Egel, and Chabria
2018). The Sacramento County District Attorney decided not to charge the officers.
After each of these citizens, protesters and reform advocates alleged racial bias among
police and accused police of becoming too militarized and, as a result, too quick to vio-
lence. The debate presented what should have been an excellent opportunity for political
science scholars to contribute their knowledge of policing, race, bureaucratic discretion,
the use of state institutions to promote racial division, and other subjects to the public de-
bate. Unfortunately, such a contribution did not happen. Despite a few notable exceptions
(such as, for example, Brehm and Gates (1993), Wilson (1978), and Wilkins and Williams
(2008)), political science as a discipline largely ignored issues related to policing. Instead,
policing, and especially militarization, research was the domain of criminologists and so-
ciologists, who produced respectable work but did not have the interest or training in the
political factors that could influence or explain police behavior.
Fortunately, this trend changed in the years following the Michael Brown shooting.
Research appeared that connected police militarization with the number of civilians po-
lice kill (Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson 2019). Others examined the effects of minority
representation on public attitudes toward police (Hong 2017b), on minority citizen deaths
(Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, and Fernandez 2017), and on racial profiling by po-
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lice (Hong 2017a). Additional work contributed to developing frameworks for studying
race and policing from a public administration and public policy perspective (Rivera and
Ward 2017). In a scathing critique, Soss and Weaver (2017) call the entire subfield of
American politics to task for its often narrow focus on the trappings of democracy such as
political parties and elections, leaving out potentially unpleasant topics such as race-based
oppression and marginalization.
This dissertation contributes to addressing the problem that Soss and Weaver (2017)
identify. By providing a theory that addresses both the causes and consequences of mili-
tarization, I hope to stimulate a scholarly discussion of often-ignored institutions and phe-
nomena such as policing in general and militarization specifically, the interaction between
race and policing, and the potential to minimize the negative consequences of both. I use
newly-available datasets from a variety of origins, such as crowd-sourcing and Freedom of
InformationAct requests, and a theory that combines aspects of political science, public ad-
ministration, sociology, criminology, and social psychology to answer questions that were
likely unanswerable in the past.
In Chapter 2, I provide a definition and theory of militarization, along with descriptions
of unique datasets I use in the analyses that follow. Chapter 3 examines the causes of mil-
itarization, describing militarization as a police response to increase threat from minority
communities. I further adapt theories of critical mass to predict a curvilinear relationship
between race and militarization. Chapter 4 expands on this work by examining how mil-
itarization affects the frequency with which police kill civilians within their jurisdiction.
Chapter 5 presents an argument, rooted in social contract theory, that militarized police and
the public experience a principal-agent problem. Militarized police kill more people, but
citizens expect police to use a minimal level of force necessary to achieve their goals–even
if those goals include maintaining a racial hierarchy. Local governments should pursue pol-
icy changes to mitigate that principal-agent problem, resulting in fewer deaths in the future.
Chapter 6 offers some conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
ATHEORY OF MILITARIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF
MAJOR CONCEPTS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Themilitarization ofAmerican police became a hotly debated topic after the 2014 shoot-
ing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, and several other similar, high-profile incidents
that followed. While there appears to be a consensus that police are becoming more mil-
itarized, scholars of political science and public administration have paid relatively little
attention to the phenomenon until recently (for some notable examples, see Wilkins and
Williams (2008); Wilson (1978)). The study of policing was typically the domain of crim-
inologists rather than scholars of politics, despite the obvious political implications of po-
lice work. In addition, the study of police militarization specifically suffered from several
glaring issues. The first is a lack of usable data for quantitative analysis. Potential mea-
surements of militarization–the acquisition of military equipment, the presence of a SWAT
team, the frequency and types of SWAT team deployments, and so on–were difficult or
impossible to obtain, leaving scholars with no choice but to study policing in a qualitative
style, focusing on descriptions of a small number of agencies. The second is the lack of a
consensus regarding what militarization is. Without a coherent definition of militarization
studying it is essentially impossible. Moreover, without a definition of militarization it is
impossible to construct a theory that explains its causes and effects. In this chapter, I define
militarization, provide an overview of my theoretical arguments, and discuss the ways I
will measure important concepts.
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2.2 DEFINING MILITARIZATION
Despite the greater attention given to militarization by criminal justice scholars, there
is still no broadly accepted definition of the term (Bieler 2016). Prior literature proposes
several possible definitions. Some scholars point to organizational characteristics as ways
to define militarization. Early research on militarization looked to the expansion of Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams from their origins as a specialized team trained in the
use of heavy force for rare situations outside the ability of rank-and-file officers, such as
hostage situations (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). These teams began in police departments
in the largest American cities, but eventually expanded to small and mid-sized towns and
cities despite the lack of any observable need due to crime levels (Kraska and Cubellis
1997). Along with their geographic expansion, SWAT teams also became more proactive.
For many, these teams represented the growing militarization of police (Balko 2006; Balko
2013; Weber 1999) due to operational and cultural similarities. SWAT teams train for a
mission primarily based on the use of force (Kraska and Kappeler 1997) and have strict
discipline (Jefferson 1990; Kraska and Paulsen 1996). However, using SWAT teams as a
definition of militarization leads to some problems. First, these teams are only a subset of
police officers within a department. It seems difficult to justify measuring a concept that
describes an entire agency based on a few members. Second, that most police departments
have some form of SWAT team presents difficulty due to few agencies being without such a
team. According to the 2013 Law Enforcement Management andAdministrative Statistics,
a nationally-representative survey of law enforcement agencies, only about 15% of police
departments do not have a SWAT team. Finally, there is no repository of SWAT team data
to facilitate study. Researchers would have to collect data by agency, making such a project
considerably daunting.
Other scholars point to easily observable phenomena such as carrying rifles while on
patrol (Phillips 2016), wearing military-style uniforms (Bell 1982; Bickel 2012), the use
of military ranks and insignia (Maguire and King 2004), and the use of command and con-
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trol centers (Kraska 2007). Others expand on these suggestions to define militarization
as the acquisition of military-style equipment or cross-training and operational collabora-
tion between the police and the military (Balko 2013; Haggerty and Ericson 1999; Weber
1999). There is evidence that weapons can cause aggressive behavior (Berkowitz and LeP-
age 1967; Turner, Layton, and Simons 1975; Carlson, Marcus-Newhall, and Miller 1990).
In addition, the use of military tactics and equipment can increase the level of violence in
a disturbance (Jefferson 1993), but other work suggests it leads to a reduction in violence
(Waddington 1993). These hardware-based definitions may be easier to measure, but they
present theoretical challenges regarding how militarization affects officer behavior when
not all officers get access to such equipment.
There are also conflicting ideas over the possible operational characteristics of milita-
rization. Doesmilitarization involve strict discipline, closely following rules (Bittner 1970),
little flexibility, and reluctance to show initiative (Guyot 1979)? Or does militarization in-
volve the encouragement of initiative and creativity at all levels (Cowper 2000)? A useful
definition of militarizationmust overcome these difficulties and provide a useful conceptual
framework for what militarization is and what it is not.
To define militarization, I begin with the concept of militarism. This is a system of val-
ues or beliefs that emphasize the use of force as an effective, acceptable, and desirable way
to solve problems (Adelman 2003; Klare 1978; Kraska 1996; Kraska 2007). Militarization,
then, is a process through which police increasingly adhere to militarism. In other words,
when police militarize, their individual and collective psychology increasingly adopts the
view that violence solves everything. They see themselves as soldiers fighting on the front
line of a war, outnumbered, out-gunned, and responsible for occupying what they see as
dangerous enemy territory. A soldier’s job is to confront, fight, and destroy the enemy. It is
not to engage in public service. Thus, more militarized police officers should see bureau-
cratic functions such as providing public goods and services to be secondary to fighting
against their enemy. In the case of police, however, the “enemy” are the citizens within the
6
agency’s jurisdiction, or a subset thereof.
Militarization, then, is both philosophical and cultural. It “begins,” so to speak, with a
philosophical transition among police agencies and officers from preferring less violence to
preferring more violence. Or, alternatively, it is a transition that involves the use of violence
to solve problems police encounter becoming more acceptable and even more desirable.
The philosophical change begets the cultural change. When the philosophical foundation
of policing emphasizes violence as desirable, the culture of police within an agency shifts
as well. Given the strength of socialization within police departments (Armacost 2003),
militarization spreads to all officers within an agency, transforming the agency’s culture to
one that not only glorifies violence philosophically but also engages in more frequent and
severe violence in the field. Police that seem themselves as soldiers fighting a war want to
look and act like soldiers fighting a war. Thus, philosophical and cultural changes lead to
observable behavioral changes.
However, those behavioral changes alone are not necessarily militarization but signs
of it. Prior definitions and measures of militarization, such as SWAT team deployments,
military-style uniforms and ranks, and the acquisition of military equipment, though fre-
quently labeled as “militarization,” are simply some possible manifestations of militariza-
tion that scholars and the general public can easily observe. They are not militarization.
In a hypothetical world where data limitations do not exist, scholars interested in studying
militarization would be able to conduct surveys of police officers asking questions regard-
ing attitudes towards the use of force and the overall mission of police. Militarized officers
would be enthusiastic about using violence, and they would see no problem with using
violence earlier, more often, and more severely than less-militarized police. The officers
would express beliefs about their job in terms of warfare and/or occupation, where they are
surrounded by a hidden and dangerous enemy and must keep tight control over a subju-
gated population, like soldiers in hostile occupied territory. As those officers become more
militarized, they would express these attitudes about violence and the job of policing with
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greater enthusiasm. Unfortunately, this hypothetical world does not exist, and scholars,
especially scholars of policing, must contend with data limitations. I discuss the specifics
of my measure of militarization below, but to be clear: my argument is not that observ-
able manifestations of militarization are militarization. Militarization is a characteristic of
police department and officer psychology.
In the next section, I provide a brief overview of my theory of militarization, explaining
the causes and effects that I test in later chapters.
2.3 ATHEORY OF MILITARIZATION
It is likely not controversial to state that a racial hierarchy with Whites in the dominant
position is an important part of social organization in the United States, or that government
institutions in the United States play a role in reinforcing that hierarchy (Michener 2017;
Pettit andWestern 2004; Sharkey 2013). The police are a part of that process. As an institu-
tion of government, the police role is to maintain public order (Wilson 1978). They capture
people who disrupt that order and separate them from the rest of society. Within a society
based on racial hierarchy, maintaining order means maintaining the hierarchy. To facilitate
this role, the public empowers police with significant authority and discretion. Although
police are street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980), their power is considerably greater than
others. Police frequently must make quick decisions in what may be life-or-death situations
(Wilson 1989), so a degree of discretion is necessary to perform this function.
Within a racialized society like the US, relationships between racial groups is the prod-
uct of their relative position with regard to areas of public life such as the economy and
politics (Giles and Hertz 1994). As minority groups improve their competitive position, the
dominant group reacts with greater hostility (Blalock 1967; Dollar 2014). In fact, the threat
does not even have to be real: the dominant group only needs to perceive a greater threat
for hostility to increase (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Because
police are agents of government, and government is an agent of the dominant racial group,
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police act as agents of that group by supporting the dominant position of Whites at the top
of the hierarchy (Jacobs and Helms 1997). There is already a robust literature on the effects
of racial threat generally onWhite behavior (Enos 2016; Giles and Buckner 1993; Hopkins
2010; Tolbert and Grummel 2003) and specifically on police activity (Alpert and Dunham
2004; Correll et al. 2007). I argue that militarization is simply another mechanism through
which police help maintain the racial hierarchy. The combination of “law and order” poli-
tics and “broken windows” policing led to an influx of resources to police agencies and a
shift of blame for crime onto the communities experiencing it (Soss and Weaver 2017). As
a result, police began to see minority populations as a dangerous enemy and themselves as
soldiers fighting on the front lines of a war to protect public order from disruption. In other
words, where minority communities are larger, police militarize more.
Of course, Black-White racial tension and the use of state institutions, such as police, to
enforce racial divisions are not new phenomena in the United States. Although militariza-
tion as a concept became salient only recently, the mechanisms that drive militarization ex-
isted throughout US history. However, before the appearance of professional police forces,
responses to increased racial threat were carried out by members of the White population,
usually on an ad hoc basis. Government institutions in the US mostly lacked the capacity to
maintain racial divisions, so private citizens had to do so themselves (Epperly et al. forth-
coming). Over time, the use of these overtly racist, oppressive tactics by groups of private
citizens lost political acceptability. Professional police, as agents of the state, enjoyed the
appearance of legitimacy and broad behavioral discretion that allowed them to maintain the
racial hierarchy.
There is a long history of police acting to repress racial minorities in the US. But with
the rise of “law and order” politics and “broken windows” policing provided both the re-
sources and theoretical framework to facilitate modern militarization. Demands for law and
order resulted in greater financial resources and manpower that facilitated the operational
shifts brought about by broken windows. Rather than patrolling set areas, police would
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flood “problem” areas, most of which happened to be predominantly minority, and punish
any infraction they found. Sweeping minority communities in large numbers created an
association between minority groups and crime, and put police into the position of an occu-
pying force in those communities. That association, and the operational shifts, contributed
to the psychological process of militarization.
Greater militarization results in a greater emphasis on the use of force as an acceptable
or desirable way to confront problems. Due to their significant discretion (Lipsky 1980),
police officers can determine how to interact with civilians. When approaching a suspect,
we might think of the range of possible actions an officer may take as a continuum ranging
from least to most violent (Worden 2015). Within that range is a subset of options the
officer believes to be appropriate for the current situation. The officer chooses an initial
action from that subset. If the suspect complies, the process ends. If the suspect resists,
the officer escalates by choosing new actions moving toward the more violent end of the
continuum. This iterative process continues until the suspect complies (Alpert and Dunham
2004). Militarization changes this process in one of three ways. First, it may move the
window of acceptable actions toward the more violent end of the continuum. Second, it
may move the officer’s initial choice within that window toward the more violent end.
Third, it may do both. In either case, the result is the same: police officers begin with more
violent actions and reach lethal force more quickly, which results in more civilian deaths.
The public may view excessive civilian deaths as a violation of a social contract between
themselves and the police (Pettit 1997; Shapiro 2003). The public expects police to use
force only when necessary and only in the least amount necessary (Alpert and Smith 1994).
However, because militarization leads police to see violence as an acceptable solution, and
because it leads police to kill civilians more often, the public perceives a violation of this
contract. This is a principal-agent problem (Miller 2005): citizens, the principal, expect the
police, the agent, to pursue the citizens’ goals, which are to maintain public order with a
minimum of violence. Violating the social contract by using excessive force causes tension
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between the public and police (King and Waddington 2004). The public should demand
political leaders pursue policy changes to enhance the public’s ability to monitor and punish
police for unacceptable behavior.
The most popular recent policy suggestion for accomplishing this is body-worn cam-
eras, devices police officers wear to record video and audio of interactions with civilians
(Friedman 2014). Video cameras offer the ability to have an objective, third-party perspec-
tive of police-citizen interactions. The use of these cameras should alter police behavior
through two mechanisms: increased self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund 1972; Gervais
andNorenzayan 2012) and deterrence (Nagin 2013; VonHirsch et al. 1999). Self-awareness
makes police officers focus on their own behavior more, which should produce more so-
cially desirable behavior such as reducing how often and how severely officers use force.
Deterrence forces officers to believe that the chances of being caught engaging in unaccept-
able behavior are higher (Klepper and Nagin 2006). This results in changes in behavior to
avoid punishment. Therefore, when the public demands its leaders implement policy solu-
tions to constrain police behavior, body cameras are a likely choice. Furthermore, adopting
body cameras should also reduce the frequency of civilian deaths.
The chapters that follow develop this theory in more detail and test the associated pre-
dictions. In the next sections, I describe how I measure the two most important concepts in
those following chapters: militarization and civilian deaths. Due to the limited availability
of useful data for examining these questions, I obtain the best data available. Descriptions
of the sources and nature of these data follow.
2.4 MEASURING MILITARIZATION
Militarization is a somewhat nebulous concept (Wickes 2015) as it involves the psycho-
logical state of officers. Kraska (2007) suggests four dimensions of militarization: material,
cultural, organizational, and operational. The material dimension focuses on the acquisition
of military weapons and equipment by the police and offers an objective way to measure,
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if indirectly, a potential effect of militarization. The specific policy I use to capture this
concept is the federal “1033” program, which allows federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment to acquire surplus military supplies and equipment. In 1997, Congress made the pro-
gram permanent and expanded its scope to include counter-terrorism (Bailey Grasso 2014).
Agency officials may browse an online database or visit warehouses in person to peruse the
available equipment, and agencies pay only the cost of transport. The equipment itself is
otherwise free of charge (Molina 2014). Figure 2.1 depicts the total dollar value of hard-
ware that law enforcement agencies received over the period of analysis. Interestingly, the
total amount is relatively stable over this time period.
I obtained data on 1033 program transfers through a Freedom of InformationAct request
to the Defense LogisticsAgency. DLAmaintains a list of all currently outstanding transfers
to law enforcement agencies, which updates each quarter. Prior to 2014, however, DLAdid
not maintain records of past quarters. Agency officials updated and replaced the quarterly
database without saving old versions. Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2014, DLA began
to save old versions of this database.
The Defense LogisticsAgency divides equipment into two broad categories: controlled
and non-controlled. Controlled items–such as weapons and vehicles–remain the property
of the Department of Defense permanently, with law enforcement agencies essentially re-
ceiving a license to use this equipment indefinitely. Non-controlled items–such as cloth-
ing–remain Defense Department property for one year, at which time the items become the
property of the agency and DLA removes the items from the quarterly database. I have no
way of knowing if non-controlled items that drop out of the data did so because the agency
returned the items to DLAor because the items reached the one-year point since transfer and
became that agency’s property. Because of this, I limit the militarization variable to only
controlled items using DEMIL codes assigned to each item, which specify which items
require certain modifications before transfer per federal policy and, thus, which items con-
stitute controlled versus non-controlled. A large majority of items agencies receive through
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the 1033 program are controlled. The dataset includes more than 1.78 million items. Re-
moving non-controlled items reduces this number by about 430,000, leaving around 1.35
million items.
The 1033 program data includes only the date DLAsent each item to the agency. It does
not include the date of initial purchase. So while I adjust for inflation from the ship date, it
is likely that this adjustment does not fully capture the value of the item at initial purchase.
However, this likely makes the results more conservative, as they will underestimate the
militarization that these items represent.
I constructed a militarization variable that accounts for military equipment in a law en-
forcement agency’s possession from 2014 through 2016. In Chapter 3, I use the average
annual dollar amount of 1033 equipment as the dependent variable. In Chapter 4, I keep
the measure at the agency-quarter level. I focus on the amount of military equipment law
enforcement agencies receive from the Department of Defense as an appropriate measure
of police militarization, as it explicitly reflects at least part of a cooperative relationship
between the military and police. I use data from the Defense Logistics Agency which pro-
vides an itemized list, by agency and date, of all such equipment. However, a simple count
of the number of items is insufficient to properly capture the concept of militarization. If
military equipment represents militarization, different types of equipment likely represent
varying levels of militarization. An armored personnel carrier provides a much more strik-
ing image than a pair of combat boots. Amilitary rifle is likely somewhere in between, and
probably represents a greater level of militarization than an infrared sight. In other words,
larger, more high-tech or intimidating equipment should represent more militarization than
smaller, low-tech, generic items, and should also be more expensive. I use the dollar value,
adjusted for inflation, of each item as a measure of the militarization that item represents.
It is worth emphasizing that my argument is not necessarily that the 1033 program itself
causes an increase in the use of lethal force. Rather, psychological and behavioral changes
in police officers cause an increase in the use of lethal force and in the number of suspect
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deaths. I argue that the 1033 program is a proxy measure that captures the psychological
process of militarization. Militarized police departments should request more–and more
expensive–military equipment in order to better carry out their perceived goal of fighting
against criminal elements. There is evidence that the 1033 program leads to decreased crime
(Bove and Gavrilova 2017; Harris et al. 2017). But like many public policies, there may
be negative consequences associated with their implementation. It seems uncontroversial
to suggest that the 1033 program probably has some desirable effects with respect to crime
control. It also seems uncontroversial to suggest that knowledge of any negative associated
consequences is important as well.
In a study similar to my own, Delehanty et al. (2017) find that militarization, represented
by 1033 program transfers, corresponds to an increase of lethal force incidents. However,
they use a sample of only four states and aggregate both suspect deaths and militarization
to the county level. Aggregating measures to the county level could lead to incorrect results
as the model loses differences between police agencies with sub-county jurisdiction. Some
agencies likely receive more than others, or some likely receive more valuable equipment
than others, and aggregating to the county loses that variation. Police departments with
sub-county jurisdiction perform most policing functions, and there are substantially more
of these departments than those with county-wide jurisdiction, such as sheriff’s offices.
Losing such variation seems quite problematic, so I leave my own data at the agency level.
2.5 TRACKING CIVILIAN DEATHS BY POLICE
TheAugust, 2014, shooting death of Michael Brown by a Ferguson, MO, police officer
ignited a firestorm of controversy over police behavior reminiscent of the public backlash
that followed the 1991 beating of Rodney King by and 1992 acquittal of officers of the Los
Angeles Police Department. The mysterious circumstances surrounding Brown’s death, the
violent police reaction to the protest that followed the incident, and a series of additional
high-profile police killings around the United States–such as the 2016 shooting death of
14
Philando Castile in Minnesota, the 2018 shooting death of Stephon Clark in California, and
others–fostered contentious debate and increased the salience of the issue of police use of
force.
The debate over the use of force from 2014 to the present also sounded similar to the
debate over the Rodney King assault. Those arguing police acted inappropriately made
claims of racial bias–individually, against the police officers themselves, and structurally,
against the police department and the broader criminal justice system. On the other side,
police advocates stressed that police use force rarely and only when absolutely necessary,
disavowing any possibility of racism playing a factor in police behavior. The controversy,
it seemed, was well-suited to examination by social scientists to determine how frequently
police kill civilians, the racial composition of civilians killed by police, and other potentially
important questions with obvious real-world implications. Moreover, policing should be
an important topic to scholars of public administration because, often, the police are the
only public administrators the public knows (Soss and Weaver 2017). Police operate in
the field among citizens, rather than in a designated office, frequently come into contact
with citizens, and, unlike other bureaucratic actors, have the state-sanctioned authority to
deprive citizens of basic civil rights up to and including the right to life. Ultimately, police
are the public face of the state’s ability to coerce and control citizen behavior (Smith 2015).
The problem social scientists face in attempting to study policing, and likely the biggest
reason for the relative lack of scholarly work, is that data necessary to facilitate even the
most foundational analyses do not exist in any official sense. Essentially all existing schol-
arship on policing involves data collected by the researcher(s) themselves and usually in-
clude only a single agency. In particular, scholars, journalists, and others who wanted to
find out information such as how often police kill civilians or the racial demographics of
civilians killed by police found that those data were not available from any government
source.
One might expect that tracking civilians killed by police would be an obvious necessity
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to provide transparency and improve public trust in policing. After all, there is a tremen-
dous amount of government-collected data on a multitude of topics, all publicly available.
However, despite some recent attempts by federal officials1 and scholarly calls to treat
police killings as a public health issue that requires reporting similar to the reporting of dis-
ease (Krieger et al. 2015), there remains no single, federally-sponsored database of police
killings. The US Department of Justice announced in 2016 that it would begin requiring
police departments to report details of police killings each quarter under the authority of the
Death In Custody Reporting Act, which represents the most concrete government effort to
collect these data, but the degree to which agencies comply with this requirement and the
accuracy of reported data remain to be seen. The reasons for this lack of data are largely
unknown, but we can speculate on what some of themmight be. Thanks in part to the rise of
law and order politics in the 1970s, which emphasized the need for increased police power
and resources to confront a growing epidemic of crime across the country, laws regarding
police violence–and the public’s tendency to trust the judgment of police officers with little
to no question because they are, after all, “[City Name]’s Finest”—potentially preclude the
need for tracking such information.
The decentralized nature of policing in the United States could also plausibly contribute
to a lack of data. There are roughly 11,000 law enforcement agencies, the vast majority
of which operate at a local level–either county-wide agencies such as sheriff’s offices or
sub-county police departments. Collecting data on police killings would require the labor-
intensive task of soliciting it from each of these agencies. Moreover, there would be no way
to verify the accuracy of received data or to require agency compliance with the request.
Still, scholars have made attempts to find usable data to study police use of force gener-
ally and the killing of civilians specifically. One option is the FBI’s annual Supplementary




cides by agency and year. The data from this report are problematic for two reasons. First,
the reports include only justifiable homicides by police officers, considering unjustified
homicides to be murder and thus combining unjustified police killings with murder statis-
tics that cannot be separated. This both potentially reduces the reported number of civilians
killed by police and makes the study of unjustified killings, specifically, impossible.
Second, the FBI relies entirely upon voluntary reporting to collect the information nec-
essary for the reports. This results in large amounts of missing data. For example, from
1988-2016, Florida reported data for the Supplemental Homicide Report only in 1992-
19952. If these missing data are not random–and random missing data seems like an unre-
alistic assumption in this case–results of analyses could be biased.
Another possible source is the National Vital Statistics System, which collects data on
multiple topics from state governments including deaths, and the associated National Death
Index, which contains the same mortality data as NVSS. These data are also problematic
for several reasons. First, like the FBI’s UCR data, they also depend upon voluntary con-
tribution, though the contributions are from state vital statistics registries which, in the case
of deaths, use death certificates and reports from medical examiners or coroners to code the
cause of death. Though this system removes police agencies themselves from the decision
of whether to contribute data, it could still potentially lead to missing or incorrect informa-
tion due to administrative errors, illegible handwriting on reports, or misinterpretation of
those reports.
Second, it is not possible to simply request data on all subjects with a specific cause of
death. Researchers must know, in advance, one of three sets of information about a person
for which they are requesting death records: first and last name and social security number;
first and last name and month and year of birth; or social security number, full date of
birth, and sex. This requirement, on its own, makes the construction of a database of police
2Florida is the only state that does not participate in submitting data to the Supplementary Homicide
Report at all. Data that would otherwise be included are available through the Florida state government.
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killings impossible, because the researcher must know identifying information about each
victim in advance.
Third, NDI data are neither publicly nor freely available. Access to these data are re-
stricted and require an application and 2-3 months of processing time for approval. The
application process requires documentation of Institutional Review Board approval for a
specific study, a physical CD that includes a text file containing information about each
subject for which the researcher is requesting records, and a check for the cost of these
records— the researcher is required to calculate on his or her own. The cost depends on
the information sought. Each submission carries a mandatory $350 service charge, plus an
additional charge of 15 cents per subject per year searched for a “routine” NDI search that
states only whether the subject searched is deceased, or 21 cents per subject per year for
“NDI Plus,” which also provides cause of death codes. And, despite the difficult process
for obtaining data, some recent evidence suggests that using the NDI for any study of po-
lice killing of civilians will be unreliable due to significant under-reporting (Feldman et al.
2017).
In sum, the study of police killings is difficult or impossible because official data on the
topic, for whatever reason, do not exist. Thanks to the drastic increase in the salience of
police violence both among scholars and in the public, other actors have begun attempting
to circumvent this limitation using crowdsourcing to gather data that would otherwise be
impossible for one person or a small group to gather. In the next section, we discuss one
such project: Fatal Encounters.
2.6 FATAL ENCOUNTERS: CROWDSOURCING CIVILIAN DEATHS
Fatal Encounters is the brain child of B. Brian Burghart, former editor of the Reno
News and Review in Reno, NV, journalism instructor at the University of Nevada, Reno,
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and now the founder and executive director of Fatal Encounters3. His interest in police
killings is a familiar story: learning of a nearby incident where police killed a man during a
confrontation after the man stole a car, he had questions about how often police kill civilians
and found that no such database exists. In 2013, he created Fatal Encounters, a project with
the ambitious goal of collecting information–not just names, but race, sex, age, location of
incident, cause of death, etc.—about civilians killed by police from January 1, 2000, to the
present.
Fatal Encounters began with Burghart sending Freedom of Information Act requests to
the FBI for information on police killings, but that strategy proved unsuccessful. Even-
tually the project grew to include a group of volunteer data collectors and, after receiving
donations from the public and a grant from J-Lab: The Institute for Interactive Journalism,
Fatal Encounters also involved researchers paid on a per-record basis.
The data collection process is fairly straightforward and is the same for paid contributors
as well as volunteers. Researchers select one or more states for which they will gather
data. Information comes primarily from newsmedia reports on police killings, from sources
such as the online archives of local newspapers and TV news agencies, but researchers
also use Freedom of Information Act requests (or the particular state’s equivalent) to law
enforcement agencies. Upon finding a relevant incident, researchers record as many of the
following as possible: subject’s name, age, race, sex, and picture; the date of the injury
that led to the subject’s death; the address where the injury occurred including address,
city, state, and zip code; the specific agency responsible for the death4; the cause of death
(gunshot, vehicle, etc.); a brief narrative description of the incident; the official ruling of
3www.fatalencounters.org
4Initially, researchers recorded all agencies involved in the incident. This led to, in some cases, the
reporting of multiple police departments which rendered determining which agency actually caused the death
impossible.
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the incident (justified, not justified, suicide, etc.)5; a link or citation of the source of the
information; and whether police were aware of symptoms of mental illness or drug use6.
Fatal Encounters interprets police killings broadly: the database includes suicides during
confrontations with police, whereas other databases do not.
Once collected, the researcher records this information in a Google spreadsheet desig-
nated for a particular state and year. For example, an incident in LosAngeles, California, in
August of 2012 would be entered into the spreadsheet for California in the year 2012. These
preliminary databases are not publicly available. Before addition to the public database,
each record goes through a fact-checking process to verify the information provided to pre-
vent vandalism and strengthen credibility. After verification, the record receives a unique
identifier number and joins the public database. Each record in the database is an individual
person, so an incident in which police kill more than one person will appear as more than
one record in the database rather than a single incident.
The most recent revision of Fatal Encounters, July 22, 2018, contains over 24,000
records from all 50 states and Washington, DC, from January 1, 2001, to the present. Ag-
gregating the total number of records by state results in a range of 26 (Rhode Island) to
4,140 (California) with a mean of 479 and a median of 336.5. Over time, states vary in
civilian deaths from slightly more than one per year (again, Rhode Island) to around 218
per year (again, California).
Aggregating the database by race results in a range of 40 (Middle Eastern) to 7,536
(White) with a mean of 3,113.6 and a median of 1,725.5, though 8,585 are reported as
“race unspecified,” indicating that the researcher(s) were unable to determine the race of
the subject. There are 5,057 Black subjects, which seems to support the common claim that
5Although, because media reports typically do not follow up on incidents, many of the dispositions are
recorded as unknown.
6It is worth mentioning that the Fatal Encounters data specifically list this item as not suitable for analysis,
likely due to the difficulty of determining what police officers new in advance of an incident.
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Black people are over-represented in police killings.
Annual deaths range from a low of 816 in 2010 to a high of 1,782 in 2013 with a mean
of 1,186 and a median of 1,255. Overall, the total number of deaths seems to trend upward
over time. There is, however, one necessary caveat: the use of media reports to compile data
on police killings likely means that older incidents are more difficult to find, so the trend
may be the result of the difficulty of finding older information versus newer. Still, it is worth
mention that, of all current projects to collect data on police killings, Fatal Encounters is
the only one that even attempts to gather information from as far back as 2000.
Validity and reliability are an obvious concern for crowdsourcing data. Fatal Encoun-
ters’ fact-checking process is meant to address both, requiring an additional verification
process of all information submitted before addition to the public database. In addition,
while reliance on media reports risks omitting incidents for which there was no media cov-
erage or media coverage is difficult to find, such as with incidents from farther in the past,
the use of government records can alleviate this concern at least to some degree by facilitat-
ing the discovery of police killings that a media search missed. Finally, a recent comparison
of three police killings databases–Fatal Encounters, a database by Deadspin, and a database
by the Washington Post–determined that records were consistent across all three (Ozkan,
Worrall, and Zettler 2017). While this study only considered reported incidents in Dallas,
TX, and while Fatal Encounters includes a much longer time period, it is still some evidence
that these sources are not biased with regard to their numbers.
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RACIAL THREAT AND CRITICAL MASS: A CURVILINEAR EFFECT
OF RACE ON POLICE MILITARIZATION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
InAugust of 2014, the shooting death of 18 year old Michael Brown (CBS News, 2014)
by an officer of the Ferguson, MO, Police Department ignited a heated debate over police
militarization and accusations of racial bias against police across the country. Soon af-
ter the Brown shooting, police confronted protesters with armored vehicles, body armor,
grenade launchers, and other equipment presenting the image of an occupying army subdu-
ing an unruly population rather than an agency delivering a public service (Rahall 2015).
Activists argued that this was evidence of an on-going trend of militarization, while law
enforcement officials defended police conduct as necessary for such a dangerous and un-
predictable profession. The debate quickly focused on race: common assertions are that
police militarization, and police activities in general, are a way to repress racial minori-
ties, particularly Blacks, with many believing that the modern criminal justice system is an
extension of past repression (Alexander 2012; Pew Research Center 2016).
The use of police to enforce racial divisions is not a new phenomenon in the United
States (Smith andAlpert 2007), with observations of such behavior going back at least as far
as Du Bois (1899), and considerable modern research exists that demonstrates an apparent
asymmetry in the way police treat Whites versus other racial groups (Baumgartner, Epp,
and Shoub 2018; Edwards, Esposito, and Lee 2018; Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg 2002;
Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007; Petrocelli, Piquero, and Smith 2003; Wilkins andWilliams
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2008), but studies of such activity neglect the phenomenon of police militarization likely
due to the difficulty in both defining and quantifying the concept and the relatively recent
salience of the phenomenon. In addition, the quantitative study of police militarization
primarily focuses on its effects rather than its causes1 (Bove and Gavrilova 2017; Delehanty
et al. 2017; Lawson 2019).
In this paper, I argue that police are a bureaucratic agent of the state that exists to main-
tain order, a function which includes the activities typically associated with policing such
as enforcing laws and capturing violators (Wilson 1978). In the highly racialized society of
the United States, maintaining order involves protecting boundaries within the racial hier-
archy established by state institutions that provide differential treatment to citizens to create
and reinforce those boundaries (Pettit andWestern 2004; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).
Police, as a part of the repressive, punitive, and exclusionary “face” of the state (Soss and
Weaver 2017), protect the hegemonic position of Whites in the American racial hierarchy
and respond to perceived threats against that position (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-
Markel 2014). In other words, as police perceive a greater threat to order, they becomemore
militarized in response. I further argue that race is an important factor in how much threat
police perceive. Over time, with the rise of “law and order” politics and “BrokenWindows”
policing practices, police begin to see themselves as soldiers on the front line of an on-going
war against an enemy–minority racial groups, which they associate with a greater tendency
towards criminality and, thus, greater danger–that outnumbers them, fighting to maintain
the existing social order against threats to its stability (Meeks 2006). They begin to see the
use of force, including lethal force, as a more acceptable means to achieve their goals–the
most important of which is to go home at the end of a day spent facing the ever-present
threat of death (Stoughton 2014). Along with a militaristic mentality comes the desire to
be equipped like a military force: the greater the threat, the greater the need for more and
1For one notable exception, however, see (Coyne and Hall 2018)
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better equipment to confront that threat. I further argue that racial demographics may have
a non-linear effect on police militarization; the association between racial minority propor-
tion(s) and militarization should be positive until the minority proportion(s) become large
enough to allow for minority groups to affect police department behavior in some way2, at
which point the association should become negative.
Following Delehanty et al. (2017) and Lawson (2019), I operationalize militarization
using records of surplus military equipment received by police departments through the
1033 program from 2014 through 2016, which I obtained via Freedom of Information Act
request. Similar to much of the existing literature that examines racial threat (Blalock 1967;
Giles and Hertz 1994; Stults and Baumer 2007; Welch and Payne 2010), I measure threat
as the non-White proportion of populations, and as the proportion that is Black, Latino/a,
and Asian using estimates at either the county (for agencies with county-wide jurisdiction,
such as a sheriffs’ office) or census place (for municipal agencies, such as town or city
police departments) level from the American Community Survey. Controlling for several
other possible causes of militarization, I find support for the nonlinear hypotheses. The
association between militarization and the non-White, Black, and Latino/a proportions of
local populations, respectively, is positive and significant until reaching a peak–at around
50% non-White or Latino/a and around 36% Black, respectively–at which point the associ-
ation becomes negative. I also discuss several potential mechanisms through which larger
minority proportions could alter police behavior.
Though currently available data do not exist for a proper causal inference study, and the
findings here should be interpreted as supporting an association rather than a causal rela-
tionship, these findings represent a potentially important contribution to the study of race
and law enforcement. While a considerable literature about differential police treatment of
2Though examining the specific mechanism through which exceeding this “tipping point” proportion
should alter police behavior, I provide a discussion of possible mechanisms in the section that follows the
results of the main analyses.
25
Whites and minorities exists, and there is an on-going public debate about whether and to
what extent police use violence against minority civilians, this paper provides a theoretical
argument that links all of this research together. Police militarize, and exert harsher treat-
ment against, racial minorities based on the perceived threat of those minority populations.
Greater threat, represented by the size of minority populations, leads to more militarization
until the minority population becomes large enough to influence police behavior through
one of several possible mechanisms. Recent research finds an association between mili-
tarization and the frequency of civilian deaths (Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson 2019), and
because police are more militarized in areas with larger minority populations, as long as the
population is not at or above the “tipping point,” that results in more Black and Latino/a
civilian deaths than White.
In the sections that follow, I expand my theoretical argument and present four hypothe-
ses. Next, I describe the data and methods I use to test these hypotheses. Next, I describe
and interpret the results. Finally, I offer some conclusions and implications.
3.2 RACIAL HIERARCHY AND THE ROLE OF POLICE
Societies tend to organize into hierarchies based on social groups. Hierarchies provide
a framework for distributing scarce resources among members of a society that benefits the
dominant group–that group controls resources, and members of the group receive a larger
share. States formalize this framework using institutions that establish and reinforce group
boundaries (Pettit and Western 2004; Sharkey 2013; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Van
Cleve 2016). While it is possible for state institutions to reinforce boundaries directly, by
differentially distributing resources to different groups, they can also do so by providing dif-
ferent experiences to members of different groups. In particular, street-level bureaucrats,
government workers that engage directly with the public and operate with significant discre-
tion (Lipsky 1980), can have a large impact on an individual’s perceived position within the
societal hierarchy, suggesting that the person is part of the dominant group (and, therefore,
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receiving preferential or simply kind treatment) or a subordinate group (by receiving harsh,
dismissive, or discriminatory treatment (Sidanius and Pratto 1999)) (Michener 2017).
There is a broad consensus, among both scholars and the general public, that a racial
hierarchy exists in the United States with Whites in the dominant position (Song 2006) and
that the processes that generate the different hierarchy-enforcing experiences of different
groups are racialized (Kohler-Hausmann 2010; Pettit and Western 2004; Reed 2002; Soss,
Fording, and Schram 2008). This relationship among racial groups originated almost imme-
diately as Europeans began to colonize NorthAmerica (Brown 1999; Carmines and Stimson
1989; King and Smith 2005; Lowndes, Novkov, and Warren 2008; Quadagno 1994). Ini-
tially, Native Americans held the subordinate position in the hierarchy, but the institution
of slavery in the North American colonies (and, later, in the United States) placed Blacks
into that position. Anti-Black racism encouraged the maintenance of a hierarchical struc-
ture with Blacks at the bottom and Whites at the top, and even today the strong anti-Black
orientation of White Americans is one reason that Blacks remain at the bottom of the racial
hierarchy (Feagan 2000). While other racial groups do not share the same history of expe-
riencing explicit, institutional, and violent oppression as Blacks, those other groups, such
as Asians and Latinos, also occupy positions on the racial hierarchy below the dominant
Whites (Song 2006).
Institutions can reinforce hierarchy in two ways, which Soss andWeaver (2017) refer to
as the “two faces” of the state. The first “face” is the face of liberal democratic government;
it is inclusive and brings the public together. Examples of this face are public schools and
hospitals. These state institutions can reinforce hierarchical boundaries, but doing so is
not their purpose. In those situations, it is easier to dismiss that result as an unintentional
institutional failure. The second “face” is punitive and repressive: criminal courts, prisons,
police, etc. These institutions are designed to exclude certain people from society. When
they reinforce hierarchical boundaries, it is intentional (Michener 2017; Soss and Weaver
2017).
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At first glance, it may seem controversial to assert that police reinforce hierarchies
through their activities rather than simply, and neutrally, enforcing law and punishing vio-
lators. Normatively we may associate the police with, for example, the Los Angeles Police
Department motto “To Protect and Serve3.” However, understanding the function of police
requires understanding the role of police. Police are street-level bureaucrats with signifi-
cant discretion, including the legal authority to kill (Lipsky 1980; Wilson 1989), and are
primarily tasked with the role of maintaining public order (Wilson 1978). Order exists when
there is no disorder, which is behavior that threatens peace or that involves conflict among
two or more people. Within a society that is strongly based on a racial hierarchy, like the
US, maintaining order means maintaining the racial hierarchy. Protecting the peace and
resolving disputes about behavior mean acting to preserve the status quo, such as criminal-
izing Black youth in certain neighborhoods engaging in behaviors that are legal elsewhere
(Muniz 2014), which places Whites at the top of the hierarchy and other groups below.
In resolving disputes and enforcing order, police act with significant discretion, allow-
ing them to reinforce the existing hierarchy via treatment of individual members of racial
groups. Thus, police are an institution that contributes to the creation and reinforcement of
the racial hierarchy in the US (Muniz 2014; Weitzer 2014). The way police treat individuals
can have this effect in one, or both, of two ways (Michener 2017). First, police can signal
to a person that they are a part of a subordinate group by interacting with them in particu-
lar ways. By using aggressive questioning, threats, physical force, or any other action that
signals suspicion police can communicate to a person that they do not belong where they
are, and their membership of a subordinate group automatically makes them suspect. Sec-
ond, police can permanently place someone into a position of hardship by arresting them,
introducing them into a criminal system that potentially leaves a permanent record or ties
them up in time-consuming and financially-draining court proceedings (Alexander 2012).
3http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1128
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Criminal records, or even temporary jail stays, could have enormous consequences on a
person’s economic stability and self-confidence, while communicating that the person is a
member of a subordinate group. In the next section, I discuss the mechanism that motivates
police to behave in this way, and what affect the severity of treatment.
3.3 RACIAL THREAT AND POLICE MILITARIZATION
As an institution tasked with maintaining order, police must confront any phenomenon
that threatens order. Within a racialized society, any threats to the dominant racial group
is also a threat to order. Threats to the dominant group involve competition between racial
groups over various resources and can be economic threats, where a minority group chal-
lenges the dominant group for jobs and wages, political threats, where a minority group
presents a potential challenge to the dominant group’s political power and control over state
institutions, or symbolic threats, where the dominant group sees a minority group as being
more inclined toward criminal or other deviant behavior (Blalock 1967). The relationship
between racial groups, then, is a function of their relative position with regard to politics,
the economy, and social life (Giles and Hertz 1994). Racial attitudes are the product of
collective beliefs about group position in the hierarchy (Blumer 1958) and the dominant
group’s fears of losing privileges or valuable resources (Weitzer and Tuch 2005). As threat
to the dominant group increases, members of the dominant group will become more hostile
to the threatening minority group. Hostility leads to demand for more state-sanctioned so-
cial control policies to preserve the dominant group’s position (Blalock 1967; Dollar 2014).
Importantly, it is the perceived threat that determines hostility, not necessarily real threat
(Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Sanders 1996).
Whites in the US are the dominant group in the racial hierarchy, and while the methods
of protecting White hegemony vary throughout history, they share a common attribute: the
use of public means of social control (D’Alessio, Eitle, and Stolzenberg 2005). Histori-
cally social control consisted of extra-judicial killings in response to greater perceive threat
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to dissuade Black people from participating in the political process (Epperly et al. forthcom-
ing). Later, social control transitioned away from open violence and into mechanisms of
the state. Increased perceived threat increases both White voter turnout and the proportion
of the White vote supporting conservative political candidates (Glaser 1994; Key 1949).
In Louisiana, there was an association between greater threat and White support for David
Duke, a prominent Ku Klux Klan leader, and in shifts in White political affiliation from
the Democratic Party to the Republican Party (Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz
1994). In Chicago, reconstruction of public housing, which forced the move of thousands
of Black families to new homes and increased the perceived threat to White hegemony in
neighborhoods to which they moved, led to an increase in White voter turnout in the new
neighborhoods and a decrease in both turnout and the White conservative proportion of
votes in the old (Enos 2016). In California, White support for Proposition 209, an effort
to end affirmative action in the state, was higher in areas characterized by greater minority
threat (Tolbert and Grummel 2003). Similarly, but more broadly, hostile political reactions
appear to be more likely after a sudden increase in perceived threat (Hopkins 2010). The
effects of racial threat also seem to go beyond the political process: schools are more likely
to use punitive discipline and implement zero-tolerance policies as the proportion of the
Black student population increases Welch and Payne 2010. In sum, despite some contra-
dictory evidence (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Voss 1996), the evidence in support of racial
threat appears quite strong in a variety of research areas.
There is some scholarly disagreement about the effects of racial threat on police be-
havior (Holmes et al. 2008; Stolzenberg, D’Alessio, and Eitle 2004), but the police are an
obvious institutional mechanism for social control, as social control is their primary pur-
pose, and they have the unique power to legally take away a person’s rights–up to and
including the right to life. Police are the primary state agent of coercion, and their activities
are necessary to maintaining the societal status quo (Jacobs and Helms 1997). Police also
operate with significant institutional discretion in addition to the discretion of individual
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street-level officers, as oversight of police departments is typically quite limited (Herbert
2001; Prenzler and Ronken 2001). It is plausible, then, that in carrying out the role of main-
taining order police also protect the privileges and power of Whites (Correll et al. 2007).
And, since police exercise discretion at all levels of an agency (Kelling 1999), police de-
partments enforce the racial hierarchy by their treatment of racial groups just as individual
officers do so by their treatment of individuals. As a result, Whites tend to see the police as
allies (Weitzer and Tuch 2005) and to see Blacks as more inclined toward criminal behavior
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1997). Minorities, specifically Blacks and Hispanics, are more likely
to see police as an abusive, visible sign of white hegemony (Bayley andMendelsohn 1969).
Police officers are more likely to use force–and greater amounts of force–on minority sus-
pects, and black suspects are about five times more likely to be killed by police (Alpert
and Dunham 2004; Correll et al. 2007). Police are more likely to initiate a traffic stop on
Black and Latino drivers in North Carolina (Baumgartner, Epp, and Shoub 2018) and to
stop and search Black and Latino pedestrians under New York City’s now-infamous “stop
and frisk” policy (Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss 2007). There is also an association between
perceived Black threat and the arrest rates of Black people on drug charges (Eitle and Mon-
ahan 2009), and an apparent relationship between Black or Latino/a threat and the number
of complaints about police brutality (Smith and Holmes 2006). Lastly, carceral institutions
show a systematic bias against minority racial groups, controlling for poverty and crime
(Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014).
It is plausible that militarization is another mechanism through which police engage
in social control to maintain order. Though militarization has received sporadic attention
(Balko 2013; Bove and Gavrilova 2017; Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson 2019), particu-
larly from scholars of criminology (Kraska and Cubellis 1997; Kraska and Kappeler 1997;
Kraska 1999; Kraska 2007; Meeks 2006), there is little to no research examining why po-
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lice militarize4 and no apparent consensus on what militarization means. For the purposes
of this paper, I define militarization as the implementation of a militaristic ideology, which
involves the adoption of beliefs and values that emphasize the use of force as an acceptable,
or desirable, way to solve problems (Kraska 2007). Essentially, this process involves police
officers increasingly seeing themselves as soldiers fighting a war among an occupied and
hostile enemy population.
The process of militarization may have begun in the 1960s with the rise of “law and
order” politics. The public, and candidates for political office, began to demand tough new
policies and more resources for law enforcement to confront the growing problem of street
crime–which was, at least in part, a stand-in for general fear of a rapidly changing soci-
ety. Despite the leveling-off and eventual reduction of crime–for which these new policies
and reasons should receive only little to no credit (Scheingold 1984)—demands for ever-
tougher crime policies continued. The law and order movement contained a noticeable
racial dimension, with high-profile politicians such as Barry Goldwater connecting civil
disobedience and protest with street violence and Black political activists with criminals.
In effect, “law and order” politics was, at least in part, a reaction to a perceived growing
threat against White hegemony (Murakawa 2008), and the resulting increase in resources
for law enforcement agencies provided greater means with which to exercise control on
minority groups (Soss and Weaver 2017).
Not long after the rise of “law and order” politics, “Broken Windows” theory called
for police to flood communities with officers and harshly punish any infraction, no matter
howminor, based on the logic that small infractions, if left unchecked, signaled disorder and
would encourage more severe crime in the future (Wilson and Kelling 1982). This theory of
policing placed the blame for crime on communities themselves, rather than structural “root
causes” as in the past (Soss and Weaver 2017), further connecting minority communities
4For one notable example, see Coyne and Hall (2018)
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with crime and justifying police behavior that resembled an occupying army subjugating
an enemy population. Combined, “BrokenWindows” and “law and order” politics increas-
ingly framed minority groups as an enemy to the dominant Whites, which leads to greater
animosity and desire for retaliation as the perceived threat from minority groups increases
(Huddy et al. 2005). “Broken Windows” provided a theoretical reason for police to mili-
tarize against minority communities. “Law and Order” politics provided the resources—
financial, manpower, and political will–to carry out such mobilization. The significant dis-
cretion of police departments and officers, operating essentially as autonomous agencies
separated from most political control (Deflem 2000), facilitated both: police could choose
which communities to flood with officers, which minor offenses to punish, how severely
to punish them, and, in general, how to use their resources to better maintain order. Po-
lice react to the perceived threat against public order by militarizing, seeing themselves as
soldiers protecting public order from a dangerous and threatening opponent. Greater threat
means police become more militarized to properly confront that threat.
Properly capturing the concept of “perceived threat” represents a potential difficulty, but
a vast literature on racial threat provides a plausible operationalization: population. Studies
of racial threat effects, including those cited previously, use either the size or the proportion
of minority racial groups within a population to measure the perceived threat againstWhites
(Dollar 2014). As the minority population increases, the potential economic, political, or
symbolic threat against White hegemony also increases. And, because White hegemony
represents order, police respond to the threat to order by militarizing more.
3.4 CRITICAL MASS: A NON-LINEAR EFFECT OF RACIAL THREAT?
What about localities where the White population is not clearly dominant? Minority
group populations could grow to the point that those groups can affect police behavior
through several potential mechanisms. One possible avenue is through descriptive repre-
sentation, either by influencing elected officials as an influential voting block or by electing
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their own groupmembers to office (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Spence andMcClerking 2010).
Larger minority populations may allow for political mobilization of minority groups to pro-
tect their interests (Horowitz 1985). In addition, elites of the dominant group may prefer
accommodation of powerful minority groups to antagonizing them (Turk 1969). Such po-
litical influence could translate to benefits for minority communities, as elected officials
from those communities empower fellow group members or White elected officials avoid
alienating a large voting bloc (Eisinger 1982; Horowitz 1985; Mladenka 1989).
Another possible avenue is representative bureaucracy, which involves minority groups
members influencing police behavior becausemembers of those groups are, themselves, po-
lice officers (Fyfe 1980; Meier 1975; Meier,Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999). There is evidence
of representation leading to beneficial outcomes for minority groups (Brudney, Hebert, and
Wright 2000), such as and of representation of gender and race leading to more positive
evaluations of police performance (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014; Riccucci, Van
Ryzin, and Jackson 2018; Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009), a reduction of complaints
by members of represented groups (Hong 2017b), and a reduction of racial profiling prac-
tices (Hong 2017a). However, findings are mixed with regard to whether minority police
officers affect behavior in a way that benefits their communities (Bradbury and Kellough
2011; Holmes et al. 2008; Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, and Fernandez 2017; Sharp
2014; Wilkins and Williams 2008).
The minority group proportion may have to exceed a critical mass–a point at which
the group proportion is large enough to affect the flow of benefits to the group–before any
benefits occur (Meier 1993). At smaller proportions, members of minority groups may
be afraid to act in a way that benefits their fellow group members and contradicts the usual
operation of an organization, but as proportions grow larger thosemembers feel more secure
in advocating for their groups (Kanter 1977). Within bureaucratic organizations, behavior is
similar: representation of a minority group requires a proportion that meets or exceeds this
critical mass before employees feel empowered enough to affect the provision of benefits
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to their groups (Henderson 1979). Within a police force, this critical mass likely becomes
even more important. Even though street-level bureaucrats such as police officers are more
likely to engage in active representation (Meier 1993; Thompson 1976), reaching a critical
mass large enough to overcome the inherently close-knit culture (Breci 1997; Armacost
2003; Mastrofski 2004) and intense socialization process (Oberfield 2011) that typically
characterize police departments.
The third possibility is the contact hypothesis, which argues that higher proportions
of minorities in a population may simple encourage contact between Whites and minor-
ity groups, leading to greater familiarity and less hostility (Aberbach and Walker 1973;
Allport 1954; Oliver 2010; Pettigrew 1986; Sigelman and Welch 1993). A considerable
literature exists documenting evidence supporting the contact hypothesis, such as differ-
ences inWhites’ opinion of Blacks in segregated vs. desegregated public housing (Deutsch
and Collins 1951) and neighborhoods (Meer and Freedman 1966). Inter-race interaction
in school settings also contributes to friendlier relations between racial groups (Patchen
1982). In general, social interaction between members of different racial groups can pro-
mote cooperation between those groups and reduce hostility (Yancey 1999), which could
also reduce the threat perceived by police if minority groups are large enough to facilitate
more frequent contact.
The effect of racial group proportions on police militarization, then, would reverse upon
achieving critical mass. Blalock (1967) theorized that the relationship between threat and
social control should be nonlinear, and there is evidence of such a relationship. Epperly
et al. (forthcoming) find a non-linear relationship between the Black population and the
probability of a lynching during the late 19th and early 20th century. While having a Black
mayor does not seem to affect Black arrest rates, arrest rates decline when the Black popu-
lation rises to around 40% (Eitle and Monahan 2009). The effect of the non-White popula-
tion, generally, on resources devoted to crime control follows a similar pattern (Greenberg,
Kessler, and Loftin 1985). Other research finds nonlinear relationships in studies of police
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resources (Jackson 1986; Kane 2003), police expenditures (Jackson and Carroll 1981), and
police force size (Stults and Baumer 2007).
Militarization may follow the same pattern. If police react to minority threat by mili-
tarizing as the threat to White dominance increases, then militarization should increase as
the minority proportion(s) of a population increases until the proportion reaches the critical
mass level. Above that point,Whites no longer have sole control of public institutions in the
locality, and other groups may influence those institutions to benefit themselves. In such
a case, police militarization should decrease as the minority proportion(s) decreases. This
leads to the following additional hypotheses:
General Threat Nonlinear Hypothesis: As the proportion of a population that is non-
White increase, the police department serving that population should become more mili-
tarized until the proportion reaches the “tipping point” at which the relationship becomes
negative.
Specific Threat Nonlinear Hypothesis: As the proportion of an individual racial group
increases, the police department serving that population should become more militarized
until the proportion reaches the “tipping point” at which the relationship becomes negative.
3.5 DATA AND METHODS
3.5.1 MILITARIZATION
Militarization is a difficult concept to measure because it involves the psychology of
police officers. However, scholars continue to try to measure the concept. For example,
in an earlier work, (Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Balko 2013) measure militarization as the
number of police paramilitary units (PPUs, also known as Special Weapons and Tactics or
SWAT teams) in the United States. Measures such as this are typically dichotomous variable
indicating whether a particular police department has such a unit. While this may be an
effective measure for some purposes, it lacks variation that could convey howmilitarized a
police department is.
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One potential avenue for measuring the level of militarization in a police department is
to use the amount of military equipment an agency receives as a proxy for its militarization
(Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson 2019). The creation and expansion of programs such as
the 1208 program and its successor, the more well-known 1033 program, facilitated such a
measure because they created relatively easy processes that law enforcement agencies could
use to obtain military equipment from the Department of Defense. In 1990, the National
Defense Authorization Act created the 1208 program to allow federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies to request and obtain surplus military equipment through the Depart-
ment of Defense to assist in anti-drug operations. In 1997, Congress changed this program’s
name to 1033 and expanded its scope to include counter-terrorism (“1033 Program FAQs”
n.d.). Similarly, the dependent variable for this paper is the dollar value of military equip-
ment in each police department’s possession from 2014 through 2016. As the 1033 data are
quarterly, I take the average amount of all four quarters each for 2015 and 2016. For 2014
I use only the fourth quarter, because that is the only quarter available in the 1033 program
data.
Some argue that this program contributes to militarization by allowing materials built
for war to fall into the hands of domestic, civilian law enforcement (Rahall 2015). More-
over, the sharing of equipment may also lead to a sharing of tactics and psychology, leading
to a more militaristic mindset among police officer (Meeks 2006). There is also evidence of
an association between militarization, measured as equipment obtained through the 1033
program, and the frequency of civilian deaths by police (Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson
2019). It seems logical, then, to assume a connection between more psychological mili-
tarization and a greater desire to obtain military weapons and equipment. In addition, the
larger, more visible, and more expensive the equipment, the more militarization it likely
represents. Thus, I operationalize militarization as the dollar value of controlled military
equipment an agency has in each quarter through the 1033 program. I obtained this data
through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Defense Logistics Agency, which
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administers the 1033 program. To obtain equipment through the 1033 program, law en-
forcement agencies with at least one sworn officer need only to browse an online database
or visit a storage warehouse and request the desired equipment. The agency pays the cost
of transport, but the equipment is free of charge. (Molina 2014). The Defense Logistics
Agency maintains a quarterly inventory of all controlled equipment in a law enforcement
agency’s possession. However, before the fourth quarter of 2014, when DLA began to re-
lease these inventories publicly, they did not maintain records of old inventory spreadsheets.
This means that the fourth quarter of 2014 is the earliest available record of 1033 equipment
by agency. In addition, only controlled equipment (such as weapons and vehicle) remain
in the inventory indefinitely. Non-controlled equipment (such as clothing) appears on the
inventory when it transfers, but after one year that equipment becomes the property of the
receiving agency and comes off the inventory. It is impossible to distinguish when equip-
ment drops off the inventory due to reaching the one year mark, and thus remains agency
property, from when the agency returns the equipment to the Defense Logistics Agency.
II include only controlled equipment, as it remains on the inventory as long as it is in the
possession of the receiving agency.
There is evidence that the 1033 program leads to public benefits such as crime reduction
(Bove and Gavrilova 2017). However, there is also evidence that police departments that
acquire more 1033 program equipment kill more civilians (Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson
2019) and, to date, there is no apparent evidence to determine what causes some police de-
partments to acquire more equipment than others. If the process that leads police to acquire
more military equipment is also increasing the number of civilian deaths, it is necessary




The independent variables measure the proportion of the population under each police
department’s jurisdiction from 2014-2016 that belongs to four racial categories: White,
Black, Latino/a, and Asian. The size or proportion of one or more racial minority popula-
tions is a common measurement of racial threat (Blalock 1967; Dollar 2014) and increasing
the size of a minority population can improve political participation (Spence and McClerk-
ing 2010) and power (Eisinger 1982). In addition, population demographics are likely not a
result of self-selection of residents into cities with more militarization, especially given the
relatively recent public awareness of the phenomenon. These measures capture racial threat
in two ways. First, the non-White proportion of a population captures the extent to which
an increase in the non-White population in general affects police militarization (Greenberg,
Kessler, and Loftin 1985). I expect a positive association between percent non-White and
militarization: as the non-White proportion of a population increases militarization should
increase. Second, the Black, Latino/a, and Asian proportions capture any racial threat ef-
fects that are specific to racial groups (Kane 2003; Eitle and Monahan 2009; Enos 2016;
Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994; Stults and Baumer 2007). For racial threat effects to
apply to either group, I expect a positive association between that racial category and mil-
itarization. I obtained these data from American Community Survey estimates for 2014,
2015, and 2016, which are based on US Census data. For the White, Black, and Asian
categories, I use only the proportion of the population that is that category and also ”not
Hispanic” to avoid overlap with the Hispanic category. To determine whether, and to what
extent, the effect of race on militarization is non-linear, I include a squared term of each
racial group similar to other research that examines racial threat effects (Eitle and Mona-
han 2009; Greenberg, Kessler, and Loftin 1985; Jackson and Carroll 1981; Jackson 1986;
Jackson 1989; Kane 2003; Stults and Baumer 2007).
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3.5.3 CONTROL VARIABLES
While a connection between racial demographics and police militarization seems plau-
sible, there are a range of other potential explanations for why police departments use the
1033 program. The following are the control variables I include in eachmodel to adequately
isolate the effects of the racial variables. For agencies with sub-county jurisdiction, control
variables (where appropriate) are at the US Census Place level. Controls for county-wide
agencies are at the county level.
Population. Police departments may become more militarized as a result of serving
communities with high populations. In these areas, the per capita number of police officers
is likely to be lower than in areas with low populations, even if the raw number of officers
is higher. The sense of being outnumbered may lead to a stronger perception of danger
for police departments, who respond by obtaining surplus military equipment for added
protection and strength. To account for population, I use theAmerican Community Survey’s
estimates of total population, divided by 10,000, by county for sheriff’s offices and county
police departments, and by census place for police agencies with sub-county jurisdiction.
Regional Variation. It is possible that variations in regional attributes other than racial
demographics contribute to militarization. In particular, people in the South are more con-
servative and possibly more punitive than those in other regions (Baumer, Messner, and
Rosenfeld 2003). To account for differences related to South versus non-South regional
distinctions, I include a binary variable where 1 indicates a state that declared secession
from the US during the American Civil War, 0 otherwise.
Political Climate. Similarly, the prevailing political ideology of a locality may influ-
ence police behavior. Cities and counties withmore conservative populations should also be
more punitive and authoritarian, supporting the increased militarization of police to main-
tain public order (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003). I use city and county preference
estimates from (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013) to measure local political ideologies.
Specifically, a higher value means the population is more conservative.
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Financial Flexibility. While the 1033 program provides surplus military equipment
to law enforcement at no charge (police pay only the cost of transport), it is possible that
police department with more robust financial resources will simply purchase equipment
themselves instead of using the 1033 program. However, using a police department’s total
operating budget correlates strongly with population, resulting in a possible collinearity
problem. The total operating budget also does not necessarily account for budget flexibility
or the availability of surplus funds, as larger police departments will almost certainly have
higher budgets than smaller departments. Instead, I calculate the operating budget per full-
time, sworn office within each agency. This value seems to more adequately capture the
concept of budget flexibility that would allow departments to purchase their own equipment
separately from the 1033 program. I also divide this variable by 10,000 to keep coefficients
manageable.
Poverty. Police militarization may be a mechanism of social control of the poor instead
of, or in addition to, racial minorities (Dolan and Carr 2015). Higher levels of poverty can
mean a greater potential threat to officer safety (Terrill and Reisig 2003). Police should then
respond to this threat by obtaining more equipment through the 1033 program in order to
better protect themselves and exert control over the population. As a measure of poverty, I
use the percentage of the population within each department’s jurisdiction that is below the
poverty line in each year according to estimates from the American Community Survey.
Violent Crime. This is, perhaps, the most obvious alternative explanation. Assisting
police in responding to crime is one of the primary purposes of the 1033 program, and
violent crime is typically more heinous–and less subject to underreporting–than other types
of crime. The frequency of violent crime should also directly affect whether and how much
police departments militarize because more frequent violent crime presents a greater threat
to officer safety. I include this as a control by calculating the number of violent crimes per
10,000 population in each year, using data from the FBI’s Crime in the United States series.
County-wide Jurisdiction. Finally, I include a binary variable that indicates whether a
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law enforcement agency has county-wide jurisdiction, such as a county police department or
a county sheriff’s office, from the 2013 LEMAS survey. These agencies are responsible for
serving a much larger geographic area than their city or town counterparts. Having to cover
a larger area with a potentially more diverse and spread out population could potentially
mean the need for more equipment.
3.5.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION
To test this theory, I compiled a dataset of both county-level and sub-county law
enforcement agencies from 2014 through 2016. The final data contain 2,135 observa-
tions5. The dependent variable is heavily over-dispersed, right-skewed (mean = 33.426,
variance = 13, 825.8), and contains 814 zeros. To account for this, I use zero-inflated
negative binomial regression to test my hypotheses6. Zero-inflated negative binomial re-
gressions estimate two models. The first is the count model, which truncates excess zeros
from the dependent variable and measures the effect of each independent variable on the
expected value of the dependent variable. The second is the zero-inflation model, which
captures the excess zeros and measures each variables effect on the probability that the de-
pendent variable is one of these zeros. Essentially, this model treats zeros as if they can be
generated by two separate processes. A police department may have zero dollars in 1033
equipment in two ways. First, a police department may not join the 1033 program. Sec-
ond, a police department may join the 1033 program but never request equipment7 In all
models the zero-inflation portion is a probit model. The ln(Alpha) parameter, which mea-
5See Table 3.1 for summary statistics
6For alternative model specifications, see the appendix.
7It may seem counter-intuitive for a police department to join a program and then not participate, but
the cost to join the 1033 program is minimal; the application consists of a half page of information about the
department. For results of a hurdle model, which is similar to the ZINB but assumes only one zero-generation
process, see the appendix.
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sures over-dispersion in the dependent variable, is significant in each model. This suggests
further support for the use of a negative binomial model.
The percent non-White measure correlates strongly with both the percent Black and the
percent Latino/a measures (0.54 and 0.72, respectively). Such correlation raises the po-
tential of a collinearity problem, so I estimate two models: one that includes only percent
non-White and one that includes percent Black, percent Latino/a, and percent Asian. These
models allow me to determine the general effect of non-White racial threat on militariza-
tion and the specific effects of the larges racial minority groups included in the American
Community Survey.
3.6 RESULTS
Table 3.2 depicts the results of the General Threat model. This includes the non-White
population proportion as the primary independent variable. The results for this model seem
to support the non-linear hypothesis. There is a positive and significant (p < 0.001) asso-
ciation between percent non-White and militarization, but the the squared term is negative
and significant (p < 0.001), suggesting a curvilinear relationship. In the zero-inflation
model, the non-White population has a positive and significant (p < 0.001) effect on the
probability of a police department being an excess or certain zero in militarization, and the
squared term is negative and significant (p < 0.001).
Though results tables can provide an interpretation of the direction and significance of
an association, the difficulty of interpreting coefficients–particularly when quadratic terms
are involved–means it is necessary to calculate and graph predicted values of the dependent
variable. Figure 3.1 depicts predicted militarization at non-White proportions from zero
to 100, with 95% confidence intervals in gray8 As the table suggested, the association is
initially positive; militarization increases from 0% non-White up to around 50%, then be-
8All graphs made using Stata’s plottig package (Bischof 2017).
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comes negative. At 100% non-White the level of militarization is essentially the same as at
0%. The peak militarization value is slightly more than 45, or $450,000 in equipment, at a
non-White proportion of 53%.
The results for the control variables are largely as expected. The variables for South,
poverty, and political ideology all fail to achieve significant. The coefficients for popula-
tion, violent crime, budget flexibility, and county-wide jurisdiction are positive and signif-
icant (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.01, respectively). Police are more militarized
when their populations are higher, they have county-wide jurisdiction, there is high vio-
lent crime in their jurisdiction, or they have more budget dollars per full-time officer. The
latter is the only result that is counter-intuitive: I expected a negative association between
budget flexibility and militarization. Further investigation into the relationship between
department finances and militarization may yield interesting findings.
Table 3.3 contains the results of the Specific Threat model, which separates non-
White populations into three specific groups–Black, Latino/a, and Asian–to determine
which individual racial groups affect militarization. These results also support the non-
linear hypothesis. Percent Black and Percent Latino/a are both positive and significantly
(p < 0.01, p < 0.001, respectively) associated with militarization, but the squared terms of
each are negative and significant (p < 0.01, p < 0.001, respectively). Again, this suggests
that militarization increases as these proportions increase until reaching a certain tipping
point where the effect becomes negative. Neither Percent Asian nor its squared term are
significant, likely due to the relatively higher position of Asians in the racial hierarchy
(Dixon 2006).
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 depict the predicted militarization of police departments with
populations ranging from 0-100% of the Black and Latino/a racial groups. In each graph,
the two racial groups not shown are set to zero. The association between the Black and
Latino/a proportions and militarization is initially positive, but turns negative and, again,
militarization reaches roughly the same level at 100% as at 0%. For the Black propor-
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tion, militarization peaks at 21.37, or $213,700 in military equipment, at a proportion of
36%. For the Latino/a proportion, the peak is 42.91, or $429,100, at 50% Latino/a. For
the Asian proportion, the pattern is similar–initially positive before turning negative at a
tipping point–but with insignificant coefficients the effect of the Asian population cannot
be differentiated from zero.
In Table 3.3, the results for violent crime, budget flexibility, and county-wide jurisdic-
tion are similar as in Table 3.2: both are positive and significantly (p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p <
0.01, respectively) associated with militarization. Population becomes insignificant, as are
the rest of the control variables. Police departments with jurisdictions characterized by
higher violent crime or county-wide jurisdiction, or with more budget dollars per full-time
officers, are more militarized.
3.7 SPECIFIC TIPPING POINT MECHANISM
There are several potential mechanisms, discussed previously, through which the posi-
tive relationship between racial demographics and militarization may reverse once the pop-
ulation proportion reaches a certain level. Unfortunately, performing the tests necessary
for determining which mechanism(s) is(are) driving this curvilinear relationship requires
data that are not currently available. However, to perform some preliminary tests that may
suggest the causal mechanism, I collected data on the racial demographics of city councils
in the US in 20119 and combined it with data on police department demographics from the
2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, and militariza-
tion and population racial demographics from 2014. In addition, I create dummy variables
indicating the city’s region of the country10. Due to the large decrease in the number of us-
9International City/County Management Association provided by Jessica Trounstine.
10Regions are from https://icma.org/icma-regions-us, with the exception of Texas, which I code as South
rather than West.
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able observations, I ran models with only the non-White proportion of city councils, police
departments, and populations. Only data on cities are publicly available from ICMA, so
observations are city police departments only. Standard errors are clustered by county in
all models that follow.
Table 3.4 depicts the results of several sequential models intended to determine the spe-
cific mechanism through which greater proportions of non-White populations would even-
tually reverse militarization. Model 3 is a negative binomial regression11 of the percent of
city councils that are non-White on the non-White proportion of a city’s population and the
control variables discussed in the preceding paragraph. Unsurprisingly, there is a positive
and significant (p < 0.001) relationship between the two. As populations become more
non-White, they elect larger proportions of non-White representatives to city councils.
The next step is to determine the association between non-White populations and non-
White council representation on the non-White proportion of police officers. Model 4 de-
picts the results of a Poisson regression model12 testing this relationship. Both the non-
White proportions of the city council and the population have a positive and significant
(p < 0.05, p < 0.001, respectively) association with the non-White proportion of police of-
ficers within a department. This suggests that the non-White proportion of a populationmay
influence non-White representation in the police, both through the influence of non-White
council representation and directly.
Next, I examine the effect of all three proportions on militarization. Model 5 depicts
the results of a negative binomial regression of militarization on all three race variables,
including squared terms to account for curvilinear relationships, and the poverty and re-
gional controls. In this model, both the non-White proportions of police and populations
11The significance of the alpha parameter and over-dispersion of the dependent variable suggest a negative
binomial model is most appropriate.
12Again, the dependent variable is overly dispersed, but the alpha parameter is not significant in a negative
binomial model.
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have a curvilinear association with militarization. Each race term is positive and signifi-
cant (p < 0.01, p < 0.01, respectively) while the squared terms are negative and signif-
icant (p < 0.05, p < 0.001, respectively). The non-White proportion of city councils is
not significant, nor is the squared term. This seems to suggest some preliminary support
for representative bureaucracy and non-White populations acting as an influential political
bloc, though not necessarily through electing their own members to public office.
3.8 CONCLUSION
This paper presents a theoretical explanation of police militarization as a result of the
racial composition of a police department’s jurisdiction. Much of the existing literature
finds evidence that police behave differently toward different racial groups, but to date there
is no attempt to study how race affects the militarization of police in the United States. I
argue that police militarization is, at least in part, a response to perceived threat of minority
racial groups to White hegemony. This racial threat causes anxiety and hostility among
Whites, who use mechanisms of the state–such as the police–to maintain their political,
economic, and social position. The less White a population becomes, the more threatened
Whites feel. The police respond to this hostility and anxiety by militarizing, in an effort
to both protect White interests and to better subjugate non-White populations, until those
populations become large enough to influence police behavior.
The results of two zero-inflated negative binomial regressions suggest support for this
theory: I find a curvilinear association between militarization and the non-White proportion
of populations generally, and between militarization and the Black and Latino/a proportion
specifically, controlling for several other plausible explanations. The association is posi-
tive until reaching a certain tipping point proportion of the population. Then the association
becomes negative. The ability of minority groups to affect police behavior could plausibly
take one, or more, of several forms. Larger minority populations could obtain potential po-
litical power as those populations represent a large bloc of votes (Eisinger 1982); political
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officials that allow police departments to continue behaviors seen by minority communities
as repressive run a large risk of losing their positions in future elections. Or they could in-
crease their representation within police departments (Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty,
and Fernandez 2017). They could use their group size to elect members of the group to
public office (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Spence and McClerking 2010). Testing the specific
mechanisms through which minority groups affect police behavior to their benefit is diffi-
cult due to the current lack of useful data for such a purpose, but future work may be able
to examine this question more effectively.
It is important to note that, while this paper presents a plausible causal relationship
between race and militarization theoretically, the analyses can only be interpreted as finding
an association empirically. Establishing a causal relationship would likely require a panel
dataset that covers a larger time period. Unfortunately, these data do not exist at this time.
Future researchmay be able to take advantage of new data that will allow for stronger causal
inference.
Still, the findings in this paper speak to several popular observations and ideas of polic-
ing. Many have made the claim that police are more likely to kill racial minorities—
particularly Blacks and Latino/as–than Whites, and recent research suggests this claim is
true (Edwards, Esposito, and Lee 2018). But to date, there has been no theoretical expla-
nation as to why. This paper provides a potential answer to that question. By combining
the findings of (Edwards, Esposito, and Lee 2018) and (Lawson 2019) with an argument
that connects militarization to race, the obvious conclusion seems to be that police become
more militarized in areas where there are more Black or Hispanic people so long as those
minority groups do not reach their tipping point level, and police that are more militarized
kill more people. In other words, police are most militarized when the population has a
large proportion of Black or Latino/a residents, but not so large as to provide those groups
with the political influence necessary to reduce militarization. Thus, police kill more Black
and Latino/a people, all else equal. This seems to be an important conclusion that offers
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plausible empirical evidence of a claim that is commonly made in popular media but, so
far, unexplored. Future research should work to further establish (or refute) this connection
and clarify its mechanisms. Determining what causes militarization and its effects–both
positive and negative–should be an important goal both for scholars and policymakers.
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3.9 TABLES
Table 3.1 Chapter 3 Summary Statistics
Variable Min Mean Max Std. Deviation
Militarization (divided by 10,000) 0 33.426 2268.156 117.583
Percent Non-White 0.200 30.599 99.200 21.781
Percent Black 0 10.793 82.100 13.942
Percent Latino/a 0 13.863 99.000 17.077
Percent Asian 0 2.913 58.400 5.016
South 0 0.421 1 0.494
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.081 22.295 1005.716 59.442
Percent Poverty 2.700 16.703 46.800 6.612
Violent Crimes per 10,000 0 19.038 195.791 25.604
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 2.803 15.836 78.899 9.191
Countywide 0 0.753 1 0.432
Ideology -1.019 0.130 0.772 0.284
Total N = 2,135
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Table 3.2 ZINB Regressions, General Threat model
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Percent Non-White 0.070(0.011)*** 86.336(2.385)***
Percent Non-White2 -0.001(0.000)*** -2.549(0.069)***
South 0.156(0.122) -166.677(3.809)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.008(0.004)* 4.830(0.122)***
Percent Poverty -0.009(0.013) 36.274(1.069)***
Violent Crime Rate 0.007(0.003)* -19.059(0.508)***





N 2,135 (814 zeros)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(9) = 93.23 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in $10,000s)
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Table 3.3 ZINB Regressions, Specific Threat model
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Percent Black 0.040(0.012)** 4.163(0.033)***
Percent Black2 -0.001(0.000)** 0.012(0.001)***
Percent Latino/a 0.057(0.012)*** -23.933(0.172)***
Percent Latino/a2 -0.001(0.000)*** 0.350(0.003)***
Percent Asian 0.039(0.042) 103.272(0.719)***
Percent Asian2 -0.002(0.001) -1.536(0.013)***
South 0.147(0.119) -167.572(1.201)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.008(0.005) 0.548(0.004)***
Percent Poverty -0.011(0.014) 2.415(0.017)***
Violent Crime Rate 0.010(0.004)** -78.762(0.562)***





N 2,135 (814 zeros)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(13) = 108.20 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in $10,000s)
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Table 3.4 Tests of Specific Threat Mechanisms
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Percent Non-White (pop.) 0.040(0.006)*** 0.020(0.003***) 0.057(0.021)**
Percent non-White (pop.)2 - - -0.001(0.000)***
Percent Non-White (council) - 0.006(0.002)* -0.007(0.016)
Percent Non-White (council)2 - - 0.000(0.000)
Percent Non-White (police) - - 0.062(0.022)**
Percent Non-White (police)2 - - -0.001(0.000)*
Percent Poverty 0.017(0.015) -0.020(0.006)** -0.022(0.019)
South -0.199(0.275) 0.434(0.156)** 0.609(0.420)
Midwest -0.694(0.390) -0.250(0.229) 0.170(0.478)
West -0.699(0.315)* 0.412(0.177)* 0.409(0.430)
Pacific -1.062(0.336)** 0.749(0.211)*** 0.673(0.545)
(Intercept) 1.234(0.395)** 1.947(0.186)*** 1.537(0.617)*
ln(Alpha) 1.477(0.110)*** - 1.917(0.060)***
N 541 541 541
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2: (6) 88.10 (7) 187.08 (11) 64.37
Prob. > χ2: 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2: 0.027 0.326 0.012
DV: % Non-White (council) % Non-White (police) Militarization (in 10,000s)
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3.10 FIGURES
Figure 3.1 Predicted militarization (in 10,000s) by percent Non-White
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Figure 3.2 Predicted militarization (in 10,000s) by percent Black
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Figure 3.3 Predicted militarization (in 10,000s) by percent Latino/a
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CHAPTER 4
POLICE MILITARIZATION AND THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
On August 9th, 2014, a Ferguson, MO, police officer shot and killed 18-year-old
Michael Brown after an encounter the details of which are still largely unclear. The in-
cident ignited a national debate about police practices in the United States that continues
today. The aftermath raised more questions about recent trends in policing, when police
officers met protesters dressed in tactical riot gear, wielding automatic weapons, grenade
launchers, and tear gas, and confronting them with military-style armored vehicles (Rahall
2015). This incident brought attention to and raised questions about what is sometimes
called the “militarization” of police departments in the United States, as well as a possible
connection between militarization and the use of lethal violence against suspects. In this
paper, I examine the relationship between militarization and the use of lethal force.
How police interact with the public is an important question in a democracy, as the
police are the embodiment of the state’s power to deprive citizens of rights–up to and in-
cluding the right to life. Thus far, despite increasing attention toward the use of lethal force
by police (“Don’t Shoot” 2014), there is little research among scholars of political science
and public administration on policing (though this trend seems to be changing; see Dele-
hanty et al. (2017); Jennings and Rubado (2017); Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, and
Fernandez (2017); Rivera and Ward (2017)) or to determine the effects of militarization on
police behavior. Instead, there is little empirical evidence to inform the contentious public
debate about the behavior of police and the use of lethal force against suspects in situations
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where such force may not have been necessary. On one side, leaders and representatives
of law enforcement claim that the use of lethal force against a suspect is a rare occurrence
(Garner et al. 1996), though sometimes unfortunately necessary, and media attention alone
is responsible for the perception of excessive use of lethal force. Others have drawn a link
between the militarization of police departments and civilian deaths. According to a Wash-
ington Post database, police killed 995 people in 2015, 963 in 2016, and 987 people in
2017 (Kindy et al. 2015). While there is only little apparent fluctuation from year to year,
there may be characteristics of police departments–such as militarization–that can predict
a higher number of deaths within their jurisdiction.
I construct a theoretical argument rooted in classic political science and public admin-
istration research on street-level bureaucrats (Wilson 1989; Lipsky 1980) and bureaucratic
discretion (Brehm and Gates 1999). I argue that police have a great deal of discretion in
deciding how to handle situations they encounter, and militarization affects the decision-
making of police by moving their preferences toward more violent responses to suspects.
Using data on the acquisition of military equipment police departments received through
the 1033 military surplus program, which I acquired through a Freedom of InformationAct
request to the Defense Logistics Agency, and a new database on police killings of suspects
in the US, I demonstrate an apparent positive and statistically significant association be-
tween militarization and the use of lethal force. To be clear, however, my argument is not
that the acquisition of military hardware causes militarization or an increase in lethal force
by itself. Militarization is a psychological state, for which 1033 equipment transfers are a
proxy measure due to the difficulty in capturing a police department’s collective mental-
ity. 1033 transfers may cause militarization, militarization may cause an increase in 1033
transfers, or there may be some alternative variable that causes increases in both. I argue
simply that there is an association between the use of the 1033 program and militarization
that makes the former a reasonable proxy variable for the latter. If this theory is correct,
then more suspect deaths are a consequence of increased militarization.
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This paper makes three important contributions. First, my findings provide empirical
evidence to the debate on police militarization. Specifically, I find a positive association be-
tween increasing militarization and the frequency of the use of lethal force against suspects.
Second, introducing literature on bureaucratic behavior provides a link between police de-
partments as organizations and police officers as individual, street-level actors, whereas
prior work on police use of force focuses primarily on either individual officers (Alpert and
Dunham 2004) or specific subsets of officers attached to elite units (Kraska and Kappeler
1997). This paper provides a theory and empirical measure of militarization that applies
to police departments as a whole but also provides for differing behavior among individual
officers. Third, I conduct what appears to be the first national, large-N study of how mili-
tarization relates to the use of lethal force, using previously unavailable data to capture the
concept of militarization1.
The next section discusses the processes through which police departments may become
militarized. Next, I discuss the possible connection between militarization and the use of
lethal force. I describe my data and methods after that. Next, I describe the results. Finally,
the conclusion offers some possible policy recommendations and avenues for future work.
4.2 THE MILITARIZATION OF POLICE
The consensus is that over the second half of the twentieth century, police departments
became more militarized (Meeks 2006). Kraska (2007) defines militarism generally as be-
liefs and values that emphasize the threat and use of force to solve problems. He defines
militarization as the implementation of a militaristic ideology. However, the militarization
of police departments goes well beyond a simple change in ideology to organizational and
psychological changes in departments and police officers. There are two potential mecha-
nisms through which police may become militarized.
1It is worth noting, however, that Delehanty et al. (2017) conduct a very similar study that reaches a
substantively similar conclusion, but with a more limited dataset. I discuss their article in more detail below.
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The first mechanism is hierarchical, encouraged by the language used by elected of-
ficials when discussing matters of law enforcement as well as cues from leaders within
law enforcement agencies. The use of warlike rhetoric can have strong impacts on public
attitudes and behaviors (Boggs 2005), and police are not immune to these effects. In the
second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, the US launched
two major law enforcement-related efforts: one to eliminate drugs and the other terrorism.
American political leaders call both of these efforts wars and required the participation of
both the military and law enforcement in carrying out these wars. For example, President
George H.W. Bush called for law enforcement to fight the drug war house by house, neigh-
borhood by neighborhood (Meeks 2006). As drugs became more prevalent in communi-
ties, the military mindset combined with anti-drug, and more generally anti-crime political
rhetoric that referred to war.
Another part of the hierarchical mechanism may be cues from police agencies them-
selves. Police culture appears to be the primary method of organizational control of police
officers (Worden 2015). Research on the use of force by police find that officers adjust their
behavior according to what agency leaders consider to be appropriate (Alpert and Dunham
2004). Similar to other organizations, officers adapt to their roles and behave according to
rules within the organization, whether formal or informal (March 1994). They make deci-
sions based on the cues they receive from police leaders and the socialization they receive
from more veteran officers. Over time, new officers adopt the perspectives and preferences
of the organization. Police training that emphasized the role of police officers as warriors
(Stoughton 2014; Stoughton 2016) could have led to police officers seeing the communities
they served as enemy territory for them to occupy and control. Police leaders see the role of
their agency as one of fighting against crime, drugs, and other undesirable elements rather
than one of partnership with the community. The emphasis on the warrior mindset moves
from leadership to mid-level supervisors to rank-and-file officers through the training and
socialization process. If a police department’s leadership is militarized, the perspectives of
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the officers–and their behavior–will change to match.
The second mechanism is operational, which has at least two primary components. The
first is direct cooperation between the military and police forces. Traditionally, the role of
the military was to provide security from external threats while civilian police protected
internal security through the enforcement of laws (Kraska 2007). Kraska (2007) also notes
the erosion of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which established a clear separation between
the military and domestic law enforcement, leading to more involvement between the mili-
tary and police in internal matters. This involvement includes cross-training, cooperation in
anti-drug and anti-terrorism activities, and sharing technology, weapons, and information
(Kraska 2007; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Meeks 2006). One example of this cooperation
is the federal 1033 program, which provides surplus military equipment to law enforcement
agencies. I use this program as a measure of a police department’s militarization, which I
discuss below. Through cooperation and inter-mingling, law enforcement may pick up the
mindset of the military–that of a force intended to use lethal violence against an enemy as
its primary function. Alternatively, police recruitment practices that involve a preference
for former members of the military for hiring as new officers could have a similar effect.
In either case, or both, police become militarized by adopting the same perspectives as the
military, where suspects become enemies that must be violently defeated and communities
become foreign territories to occupy and subdue.
The second component of the operational mechanism is the creation and expansion of
elite police unitsmodeled onmilitary special operations forces. Alongside thewars on drugs
and terror, and the new access to military training and equipment, police created special
units referred to variously as Special Response Teams (SRTs), Police Paramilitary Units
(PPUs), or SpecialWeapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. Police departments see these teams
as elite, military-style special operations units trained as use-of-force specialists (Kraska
and Cubellis 1997). Although few officers receive the training, equipment, and experience
that goes with being a member of these teams, such training and experience–which involves
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more emphasis on the use of force–can cross over into officers who do not directly receive
such training because the members of these specialized teams perform the same duties as
other officers when not called to a SWAT-related action. Comparison of the use of lethal
force between SWAT and non-SWAT officers shows little difference (Williams andWestall
2003).
Kraska and Kappeler (1997) and Kraska and Cubellis (1997) document the sharp in-
crease in the number of these units around the country. In addition to the number of these
units, there has also been an increase in their frequency and purpose of use. Originally in-
tended for use in rare situations that involved hostages or barricaded suspects (Kraska and
Kappeler 1997), they began to participate in more routine activities such as patrolling and
serving search warrants (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). Deployments of these teams increased
more than 1400% since the 1980s (Rahall 2015).
These mechanisms–operational and hierarchical–represent a trend toward increasing
militarization of law enforcement. Officers become militarized by exposure to both mecha-
nisms. New officers develop militarized attitudes by both self-selection of potential officers
who already share these attitudes (Oberfield 2011), by professional socialization with other,
more tenured officers (Alpert and Dunham 2004; Worden 2015), and by leadership-driven
culture that emphasizes the role of police officers as warriors (Stoughton 2014). In other
words, both prior ideals about policing acquired before entry into the police and early so-
cialization with veteran officers and leaders after entry influence the psychology of police
officers. In the next section, I explain how police militarization interacts with the discretion
police enjoy as street-level bureaucrats to lead to more frequent use of lethal force.
4.3 POLICE MILITARIZATION AND USING LETHAL FORCE
A considerable literature exists on street-level bureaucrats, beginning perhaps with the
initial publishing of Lipsky (1980). Street-level bureaucrats are those employees of gov-
ernment agencies who deal directly with the public. They are social service caseworkers,
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clerks at the Department of Motor Vehicles, health and safety inspectors, etc. The cen-
tral characteristic of these employees is that they engage in regular, face-to-face interaction
with clients (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). They also typically have significant
discretion when making decisions (Wilson 1989) but take cues on how to make decisions
from agency goals (Keiser 2010) and organization (Wilson 1989). Street-level bureaucrats
must address interactions with citizens individually, but they also must apply policies based
on routines and simplifications passed down through the organizational hierarchy (Lipsky
1980).
Police officers are a special type of street-level bureaucrat (Brehm and Gates 1999)
charged with maintaining public order and apprehending those who disrupt that order. Po-
lice interact directly with citizens and typically work without direct supervision, which
grants significant discretion (Lipsky 1980) and power (Oberfield 2011). Officers often
must make life or death decisions in stressful situations (Wilson 1989), and discretion al-
lows them the flexibility to choose the response they feel is most appropriate (Nowacki
2015).
These stressful situations include determining when and whether to use lethal force
against a suspect. There is little evidence to suggest that police department policies are
effective in restricting the use of lethal force (Nowacki 2015) and little likelihood of legal
punishment for using lethal force inappropriately (Skolnick 2002). Police officers also
have little reason to worry that supervisors will review their responses to routine situations
frequently (Wilson 1989). This suggests that determining how to react to a given situation
is largely up to the individual, based on their appraisal of the situation, their psychological
state, and the cues they receive from the department itself.
That is a great deal of power for many types of government employees. But for a police
officer, whose job may include the state-sanctioned use of violence, up to and including
lethal force, against suspects, it is tremendous. Force is a key element of the power of
police (Oberfield 2011), and citizens have little means with which to hold police officers
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accountable for their actions, especially because many of the citizens that interact with
police are suspects. While there are some mechanisms through which citizens may be able
to hold officers accountable for their actions, such as citizen review boards, voicing public
opinion to elected officials, etc., those mechanisms happen after the interaction. During the
interaction itself, police have all of the power (Alpert and Dunham 2004; Thomann 2015).
This means that officers largely use their own judgment when deciding whether to use lethal
force, and it is plausible that militarization may shape this judgment.
In any encounter, both police officers and citizens attempt to maintain their own au-
thority despite the asymmetrical distribution of power between them (Alpert and Dunham
2004). When one side fails to provide the respect for authority that the other side expects,
or when one side blocks the other from pursuing its goals, then the result may be citizen
resistance, the use of force by the police, or both. The confrontation escalates until one
party changes its goals and, thus, its behavior. That escalation occurs along a continuum
from minimal to extreme force (Worden 2015).
Discretion provides police officers with the ability to choose how to respond to a given
situation. For example, an officer confronting an armed suspect may attempt to negotiate
with the suspect so they give up their weapon voluntarily. The officer may use less-than-
lethal force such as a taser or physical violence to subdue the suspect. Or the officer may
attempt to kill the suspect. Each of these options is a potentially valid choice, and each
could potentially resolve the confrontation. Militarization is a psychological transformation
within police departments–and officers–that shifts behavior toward lethal force as a more
acceptable and earlier response.
Imagine that, for a given police officer in a given situation, the universe of possible
responses from which the officer can choose is on a one-dimensional continuum arranged
from least violent to most violent (Terrill 2005; Worden 2015). On one extreme, perhaps,
is the option for the officer to do nothing. On the other extreme, the officer may summar-
ily execute the suspect involved. Between these two extremes lies every other possible
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alternative response to the situation. Of course, not every possible alternative along this
continuum would be either legally or morally acceptable, to the officer or to his supervi-
sors (and, despite the general lack of supervision for police officers, summarily executing
a citizen suspected of jaywalking, for example, would likely lead to disciplinary action and
criminal prosecution simply due to the extremely disproportionate response). Each offi-
cer, then, has a subset of possible alternatives that he or she believes would be acceptable
choices for that given situation. This window represents the realistic options from which
the officer chooses. Within that window of acceptable options, then, is the specific response
the officer believes to be the most preferable for that given situation.
After choosing a response, the officer then adjusts that choice based on the response of
the suspect. If the suspect surrenders and complies with the officer, then the situation is
resolved. If the suspect draws a gun and fires, the officer escalates his or her own response.
If the suspect signals defiance without resorting to violent resistance, such as verbal defi-
ance, nonviolent resistance (such as laying on the ground and refusing to move), or fleeing,
the officer will also escalate to a more violent response to subdue the suspect. It seems
plausible to assume that, usually, any adjustment to an initial response will likely be an ad-
justment toward the more violent end of the continuum rather than to the less violent end.
So an encounter with a suspect is, essentially, the process of choosing the most preferred
initial response from within the subset of acceptable responses, and escalating toward more
violent responses until the situation resolves. In other words, the use of force by a police
officer is an iterative process that continues until the encounter ends (Alpert and Dunham
2004; Goldstein 1979).
Due to the operational and hierarchical changes discussed above, militarization may
change how this iterative process works. Officers take cues from their superiors and the
characteristics of the organization (Scott 1997), and in a militarized department the win-
dow of acceptable options may move toward the more violent extreme of the continuum.
If the officer is taking cues on what actions are acceptable from his superiors within the
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department— based on, perhaps, agency objectives (Keiser 2010; Thomann 2015)—then
he or she may believe that, within a militarized police department, more violent responses
to suspects are acceptable or more desirable. Additionally (or alternatively), militarization
may move an officer’s preferred choice within the window of acceptable responses toward
the more violent, because the officer’s psychological state is more militarized and, there-
fore, more violent.
In either case, the officer’s psychological state changes based on adoption of the cul-
ture and perspectives of the organization’s leaders and the officer’s colleagues. Thus, while
discretion and street-level decision making are individual processes, they also involve the
police department as a whole. Furthermore, while research suggests that suspect behavior
is the primary determinant of an officer’s response to that behavior (.Friedrich 1980; Gar-
ner et al. 1996), militarization may influence the officer’s psychological state, which would
then influence the officer’s response. Police use of force is, essentially, a matter of psychol-
ogy (Alpert and Dunham 2004). The officer may perceive a suspect as more of a threat due
to this psychological tendency toward violence. Alternatively, the officer, unable to con-
sider all possible alternatives and consequences to possible actions in such a short period of
time (March 1994), may simply adopt a more violent response as a matter of convenience.
Thus, the officer begins with a more violent response toward a suspect and, if escalation
is necessary, moves toward increasingly violent responses more quickly. The result is that
militarized police will resort to violence more often and more quickly than non-militarized
police, which means militarized police will use lethal force more frequently. This leads to
my hypothesis:
As police departments become more militarized, they will kill suspects more frequently.
4.4 DATA AND METHODS
To test my hypothesis, I began with a master list of all non-federal and non-state law
enforcement agencies in the United States from the 2008 Census of State and Local Law En-
66
forcement Agencies. The number of suspect killings is from Fatal Encounters2, a database
created with the goal of collecting information on law enforcement-related deaths. This is
currently the most comprehensive database of the use of lethal force by police available.
Due to limited data availability for the militarization variable (discussed below), I restrict
the time period to the fourth quarter of 2014 through the fourth quarter of 2016. Fatal En-
counters includes data on the victims of lethal police violence over this time period in all
fifty states. Most of the information in Fatal Encounters comes from newspaper articles
and other public records, allowing for easy fact-checking and verification. The final data
for analysis consist of 11,848 observations of law enforcement agencies with either county-
wide or sub-county jurisdiction from the fourth quarter of 2014 through the fourth quarter
of 2016.
My dependent variable for all hypotheses is the number of people the law enforcement
agency killed during each quarter over the period of analysis. The source of this variable is
the FatalEncounters.org database, which contains records of individual suspects killed by
police, aggregated to a count of the number of people a police department killed in each
quarter. For example, if three people in the fourth quarter of 2014 died as a result of activity
of a particular police department, that agency-quarter observation’s value for the dependent
variable will be three. The agency-year count ranges from zero to 9 deaths, with a mean of
0.019, and variance of 0.0353.
Fatal Encounters is a free database administered by D. Brian Burghart, former edi-
tor/publisher of the Reno News and Review and journalism instructor at the University of
Nevada-Reno. Volunteers and paid researchers use media reports and public records to con-
tribute information about the killing of suspects by police that includes the victim’s name,
race, age, the location of the incident, the agency responsible, and other incident-specific
2www.fatalencounters.org
3I use quarterly data because it is subject to the least amount of aggregation effects. For a supplementary
analysis using data aggregated to years, see the appendix. Results are substantively similar.
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information. It is still a work-in-progress, but is complete for all 50 states andWashington,
DC, from 2013-2016, and is nearing completion for all years going back to 2000. While it
is a fairly new database, scholars are already using it in studies of lethal force (Delehanty
et al. 2017; Jennings and Rubado 2017; Lawson 2019).
My primary explanatory variable of interest is the value of military hardware each
agency possessed in each quarter from the fourth quarter of 2014 through the fourth quarter
of 2016, adjusted for inflation to 2016 dollars, divided by 10,000 to keep the coefficient
sizes manageable4. I lag the variable by one quarter because police departments may re-
quest and receive items through the 1033 program at any point in a quarter, so it seems more
sensible to lag the variable in order to adequately capture the level of militarization that it
represents. Lagging the variable also helps to account for a potentially endogenous rela-
tionship between use of the 1033 program and the number of suspects killed in a quarter5,6.
4.4.1 CONTROL VARIABLES
As plausible as the link between militarization and the use of lethal force seems to be,
there may be other explanations. It certainly is not the only cause of the use of deadly force.
There may be some other factor or factors driving the use of lethal force by police. I explore
a brief theoretical basis for each mechanism in the sections that follow, and I describe their
inclusion in my analysis as control variables.
4The appendix includes models using several different measures of militarization, such as the log of
this total dollar value, the total number of items received, and dummy variables indicating whether a police
department received items of high value. In models that involve dollar values of equipment in some way, the
results remain positive and significant. The total number of items was statistically insignificant.
5As an additional test for endogeneity, I ran two additional OLS models that included a lagged number
of suspect deaths and militarization as the dependent variable: one with two-way random effects and one
with standard errors clustered by agency. This analysis suggests there is no endogenous relationship between
suspect deaths and militarization.
6It is also worth noting that the military’s level of surplus equipment drives what is available to police
through the 1033 program, not the level of demand for such equipment from police departments (Harris et al.
2017).
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Population. High populations may increase the use of lethal force simply because there
are more people for police to encounter. In a high-population area, the per capita number
of police officers will likely be lower than in low population areas (even if the raw number
of police officers is higher). That sense of being outnumbered alone may evoke a sense of
threat among police officers, who feel a need to protect themselves against the threat. They
may react to suspects with lethal forcemore quickly to avoid becoming the victims of amob.
Moreover, it may be the case that large police departments, which serve communities with
larger populations, tend to have less supervision for street-level officers because the larger
number of officers stretches the supervisors thin (Nowacki 2015). On the other hand, larger
police departments may use lethal force more often simply because there are more officers
and more people for them to use such force against. Population, then, serves as a proxy
variable for the size of a police department and allows me to account for different behav-
iors from police departments of different sizes and to account for differences in the number
of suspect deaths based on population, which reduces potential bias in model estimates.
I obtained populations from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative
Statistics, which lists the total population each police department served within its jurisdic-
tion in 2012. While these data are two years old at the starting point of my analysis, it is
unlikely these numbers changed by any large amount over that period.
Poverty. There also may be a connection between poverty and the use of lethal force
(Hirschfield 2015). There may be two reasons for this. The first is that, to police, poverty
suggests danger because officers associate problem places with threats to officer safety
(Terrill and Reisig 2003). Impoverished areas tend to also be high crime areas, particu-
larly violent crime (Hsieh and Pugh 1993), leading to officers fearing for their safety when
present in these areas. Thus, higher levels of poverty should lead police to use lethal force
more often out of a greater perceived need for self-defense. Second, poor people make up
a traditionally marginalized demographic (Terrill and Reisig 2003). Police may use lethal
force more frequently in high-poverty areas as a means of social control over the poor
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(Chevigny 1990). I measure poverty as the percent of the population within a police de-
partment’s jurisdiction with income below the poverty line. This information came from the
2015 American Community Survey and is at the level of US Census Place for sub-county
police departments and county for county-level departments.
Race. Research suggests police are more likely to use force, including lethal force,
against members of minority racial groups (Terrill and Reisig 2003). The most likely ex-
planation is an extension of the social control argument discussed in the previous paragraph.
The difference, however, is that the target of that control is a racial minority rather than the
poor. Within the US, that race is most likely African Americans, given the long history
of both legal and social oppression suffered by that group. Additionally, police assume
African Americans tend toward crime more than whites, and view them with greater sus-
picion (Werthman and Piliavin 1967). It also seems that areas with higher populations of
African Americans have a higher frequency of police violence (Jacobs and O’Brien 1998).
There may be a similar effect in areas where the largest minority is Hispanic, rather than
black. While officers may not be intentionally or consciously targeting racial minorities,
implicit biases that lead to harsher treatment of minorities may still exist (Smith andAlpert
2007). I include the percentage of the population, again by US Census Place, that isAfrican
American and the percentage that is Hispanic from the 2010 US Census. For the African
American population, I include the proportion that isAfrican-American but not Hispanic in
order to avoid overlap between the two variables. Again, while these figures are somewhat
dated, it is unlikely that the numbers changed a great deal.
Violent crime. This is likely the most obvious alternative explanation for an increased
use of lethal force. Violent crime, rather than all crime, should lead to this effect due to the
more serious nature of those crimes compared to others, such as property crime. Violent
crime presents amuch higher potential threat to officer safety than property crime, so violent
crime should be a more reliable measure of crime as it relates to the use of lethal force.
Police officers should become more aggressive and more punitive when in high violent
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crime areas because high levels of crime mean an increase in the probability of violent
interactions with the public (Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969; Terrill and Reisig 2003). That
aggression, then, means more frequent use of lethal force against suspects. For violent
crime, I use the number of violent crimes per 10,000 people at the county level. At the time
of writing, these appear to be the best available data on violent crime.
While the measures for poverty, crime, and racial minority populations may seem to
overlap significantly, they each represent distinct explanations for the use of lethal force
by police. Violent crime represents a direct threat to officer safety. Areas with high levels
of violent crime mean that officers will likely encounter violent crime more often, which
threatens their own safety. Areas with high poverty and large minority populations may
experience high levels of violent crime, but policemay also bemore likely to use lethal force
as a means of social control of these groups regardless of crime. Moreover, the correlations
between each of these measures are modest at best (the highest being 0.389), so there is no
risk of multicollinearity by including them in the model.
Budgetary Resources. The most frequent participants in the 1033 program seem to be
smaller, more rural police departments with fewer resources (Molina 2014). It seems plausi-
ble that police departments with greater financial flexibility could potentially use their own
departmental resources to purchase equipment that smaller departments receive through
the 1033 program. In such a case, these departments would be more militarized than they
appear in the data using the 1033 program as a proxy, because they received the same or
similar kinds of equipment without using that program. The militarization measure corre-
lates with total department budget at 0.31, suggesting that this sort of substitution effect is
not present. However, budgetary flexibility may still influence the use of lethal force due
to its potential effect on hiring. Police departments with less budgetary resources may have
more limited options for hiring due to the salaries, training, etc. that they can offer. This
may lead some departments to hire officers that are less professional, or to provide new
officers with less training, both of which could lead to more incidents of lethal force. Thus,
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it is important to control for a police department’s budgetary situation. I use the 2013 Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, which asked for each de-
partment’s operating budget for the year that included January 1, 2013. I divide this amount
by the total number of sworn officers to account for department size, and I divide the result-
ing amount by 10,000 to keep coefficients manageable. This measure better captures the
concept of “budget flexibility,” as such a concept seems to involve both financial resources
and department size, rather than simply the size of a department’s budget7.
County-wide jurisdiction. Having county-wide versus sub-county jurisdictionmay have
an impact on the use of lethal force. Most police work is not done at the county level.
County-wide police departments operate in more rural areas with lower populations and
population densities, which means they may simply come into contact with fewer people.
Contact with fewer people means fewer opportunities to use lethal force. However, depart-
ments with sub-county jurisdiction perform most police work, operating in larger towns
and cities with higher population densities and interacting with more people. I incorporate
county-wide jurisdiction into my analysis using a binary variable which indicates whether
a particular police agency has county-wide jurisdiction.
4.4.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The first conclusion one may draw from these data is that the dependent variable is
overly dispersed. Using a negative binomial model is appropriate. Second, there are a lot
of zeros, because suspects that police officers kill are a relatively small fraction of the total
number of people officers encounter in a quarter. I use a zero-inflated negative binomial
model in order to account for the excessive zeros which, according to the assumptions of
7In addition, total budgets correlate with population at around 0.9, which likely introduces multicollinear-
ity into the model. This budget-per-officer variable correlates with population at around 0.24.
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the ZINB model, come from a process distinct from a zero count8 (Zeileis, Kleiber, and
Jackman 2007). Results of a Vuong test suggest that the zero-inflated negative binomial
regression model more closely captures the process that generated these data than a simple
negative binomial model (p < 0.000).
4.5 RESULTS
Table 2 depicts the results of this model9. The top section of the table is a truncated
count model measuring the impact of each variable on the predicted probabilities of each
ascending count level, while the bottom section is a logit model measuring the impact of
each variable on the occurrence of an excess zero in the data. Thus, I expect the coefficient
for militarization to be positive in the top section and negative in the bottom. The coeffi-
cients measure the change in log odds so they are not directly interpretable, but there are
some conclusions to take from these results.
Militarization has a positive and statistically significant(p < 0.05) association with the
number of lethal force incidents, but has no significant association in the zero-inflation
model. This suggests that militarization has an effect on the use of lethal force by police,
specifically by increasing the number of suspects police kill in a quarter, all else equal.
The results provide support for the hypothesis that as militarization increase, so does the
8Amodel that incorporates two-way fixed effects would be desirable to account for unobserved variation
between agencies and years. Unfortunately, fixed effects models drop cross-sectional units with no variation
in the dependent variable. Because there are a large number of these units (i.e. entities with zero deaths),
and because the lack of variation is due to the dependent variable being zero across all years, that leads to a
large decrease in the number of observations. Those zeros are theoretically relevant, however, and dropping
them distorts the analysis. In addition, having a variance greater than the mean suggests overdispersion in
the dependent variable, so I use a zero-inflated negative binomial model for the analysis. These results are
robust to several other model specifications. For additional statistical models used as robustness checks, see
the appendix.
9While this analysis uses quarterly data, I also run a robustness check using annual data. This alternative
model uses the lagged average annual total of the militarization measure and aggregates suspect deaths to the
year rather than the quarter, in case using quarterly data somehow biased the results. The conclusions are
substantively similar. See the appendix for this alternative model.
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number of suspect deaths. The zero-inflation model measures the effect of each variable on
the occurrence of a zero in the dependent variable, so the null result suggests militarization
has no effect whether police kill any suspect in a particular quarter or not. The relative rarity
of both high levels of militarization and of killing suspects (particularly more than one per
quarter) may be affecting the calculation of the zero-inflation model. Alternatively, other
factors that are significant in the zero-inflation model may account for most of the influence
on the change from a zero to a one, while militarization has a stronger influence on moving
from one death to a higher number. It may also be the case that militarization does not
affect the likelihood of a police department killing no suspects, but for police departments
that kill at least one suspect increased militarization makes them more likely to kill more
than one.
Substantively, how many deaths should be expected as militarization increases? The
raw coefficients for these models cannot answer these questions due to the difficulty of
interpretation. I calculated predicted counts with 95% confidence intervals for each, pre-
sented in Figure 2, which depicts the predicted number according to the model. There is a
fairly steady increase in predicted deaths as militarization increases, though the confidence
interval widens slightly more at higher levels. While my measure of militarization does not
directly capture the psychological process, it seems safe to conclude that militarization has
a positive and significant association with how frequently police kill suspects.
According to Figure 2, the model predicts one suspect death at a militarization level of
around 375 (or $3,750,000). The expected number of deaths increases to two at around 500
(or $5,000,000). It then doubles to 4 deaths at around 750 (or $7,500,000). It is important to
note, however, that few police departments in the sample reach such high levels of milita-
rization. A value of 400 in the militarization measure (which corresponds to $4,000,000 in
military equipment) is around the 99.5 percentile. While the highest level of militarization
in the sample is 1036.0592 (the Houston Police Department in the 3rd quarter of 2016),
the extremely skewed nature of this variable means that few police departments even get
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close to that amount. Still, this result supports to the claim that militarization influences the
killing of suspects by police.
Next are the results for the control variables. There is a positive and significant associa-
tion between population and the number of lethal force incidents (p < 0.05) and a negative,
significant (p < 0.001) association between population and the likelihood of a zero. Thus,
population seems to both increase the number of suspects killed and decrease the likelihood
of a zero. Poverty is not significant in either section, suggesting that lethal force may not
be a method of social control of the poor.
The percentage of the population that is Hispanic also has no association with the num-
ber of suspect deaths in either the count model or the zero-inflation model. Results for
the percentage of the population that is black are somewhat counterintuitive. This variable
has an insignificant relationship with the number of deaths and with the likelihood of zero
deaths. Taken together, the previous two variables seem to suggest that the racial composi-
tion of an area has no effect on how often police use lethal force against suspects.
The violent crime rate’s result is as suspected. It has a positive and significant asso-
ciation with the total number of suspect deaths (p < 0.05) but no association in the zero-
inflation model. The results suggest, in line with the theoretical argument, that police de-
partments in higher-crime environments will use lethal force more frequently. However,
the jurisdictional level of the agency also plays a roll. Having a county-wide jurisdiction
has a negative and significant association with the frequency of suspect deaths (p < 0.001),
but also a negative and significant association with the likelihood of a zero (p < 0.05).
This is a seemingly contradictory result, but perhaps it makes more sense than would be
apparent initially. It is possible that agencies with county-wide jurisdiction, who may also
serve larger populations than sub-county police departments, are more likely to kill at least
one suspect in a quarter, but some other factor, such as the higher likelihood of serving pri-
marily rural rather than urban populations, means the total number remains relatively low.
Finally, operating budget per officer has no association with the frequency of lethal force.
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4.6 CONCLUSION
This paper represents an important contribution to a contentious public debate by study-
ing the impact of police militarization on the number of suspects that police officers kill.
Results of a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model with a dataset of over 11,000
agency-quarter observations support the hypothesis that there is an association between
militarization and suspect deaths. In other words, increasing militarization corresponds to
more suspect deaths, ceteris paribus. In addition, this paper presents a theoretical argument
that combines institutional attributes of police departments and the roles and behavior of
individual officers to explain how militarization affects the decision to use lethal force.
Other factors also seem to influence the use of lethal force. The variables with a sig-
nificant effect on the frequency of lethal force are the total population, the rate of violent
crime, and the jurisdictional level of the police department. County-wide jurisdiction seems
to decrease the number of suspect deaths, while the other variables increase that number.
Racial minority populations seem to have no effect.
The results of this paper have important implications. If society agrees that increasing
the number of people killed by police is undesirable, steps should be taken to reduce the
number of suspect deaths either through reducing militarization or, possibly, by reducing
the extent to which militarization can affect officer behavior. What steps may counteract
this increase in lethal force is a question for future work, but some scholars and activists pro-
pose several potential avenues. One potential solution is rethinking the process of training
officers so that, for example, they learn to build connections with their community through
non-enforcement interactions and to use tactical restraint in order to minimize the risk of
an enforcement action escalating to violence (Stoughton 2014). Other policies regarding
oversight of police behavior and strengthening policies on acceptable use of force, as well
as consequences for violating those policies, are also possible mechanisms for reducing the
use of lethal force . More broadly, a new emphasis on principles referred to as Guardian
Policing–as opposed to Warrior Policing–seeks to instill values based more on public ser-
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vice through crime prevention and control than on fighting crime (Stoughton 2016).
Other potential future directions for research are to continue exploring how race fits into
the operation of police departments and the behavior of officers and other aspects outside the
scope of this paper: causes of militarization; how officer psychology, such as militarization,
affects officer behavior toward suspects and other civilians; how agency-specific training
and supervision play a role; and other potentially important topics relating to policing. Im-
proved data resources and possibly experimental research should play a role in expanding
this literature. Scholars are now making greater strides in the study of policing, and there
is wide latitude for increase the scope of this research area.
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4.7 TABLES
Table 4.1 Chapter 4 Summary Statistics
Variable Min Mean Max Std. Deviation
Deaths 0 0.019 9 0.187
Militarization (divided by 10,000)
(lagged)
0 6.415 2322.100 35.798
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.020 10.776 996.279 57.129
Percent Poverty 0 16.968 89.6 8.828
Percent Latino/a 0 11.056 100 16.848
Percent Black 0 11.385 98 18.294
Violent Crimes per 10,000 0 7.409 114.943 8.818
Budget per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.836 13.402 140 7.818
Countywide 0 0.211 1 0.408
Total N = 11,848
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Table 4.2 ZINB Regression, effect of militarization on deaths
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Militarization (lagged, divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.000)* -0.001(0.002)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)* -0.222(0.063)***
Percent Poverty 0.006(0.015) -0.005(0.021)
Percent Latino/a 0.011(0.008) 0.005(0.011)
Percent Black 0.004(0.006) -0.002(0.007)
Violent Crime Rate 0.019(0.009)* 0.003(0.014)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2(8) = 255.18 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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4.8 FIGURES
Figure 4.1 Predicted number of suspect deaths at varying levels of militarization, with
95% confidence intervals (in gray).
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CHAPTER 5
WATCHING THE WATCHERS: POLICE VIOLENCE AND
BODY-WORN CAMERAS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
After the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, calls for police agencies to
require the use of body-worn cameras dramatically increased. The shooting led to protests,
violent police response, and an intense public debate over the nature of police work and
the use of force by police officers. Brown’s mother publicly called for police to wear cam-
eras (Aton 2016), and many credit Brown’s death as the catalyst that created a national
movement advocating body camera use (Sanburn 2014; Somashekhar et al. 2015). Then-
President Barack Obama requested $75 million to purchase 50,000 body cameras for law
enforcement agencies around the country, claiming that evidence found cameras elicited
more positive behavior from officers and the public and that cameras improved account-
ability and transparency (Friedman 2014). Proponents of body cameras frequently cited
these effects as the reason for police to adopt body cameras, and support for body cam-
eras quickly became widespread likely due to the apparent simplicity of the solution to a
difficult problem (Developments in the Law 2015). Surveys continue to find considerable
support among the public. One survey found that 77% of respondents said they would feel
safer if officers wore body cameras, and 74% said that police departments should require
officers to wear cameras1. A recent Cato Institute/YouGov poll found 89% support for the
1http://www.news9.com/story/26345123/arrest-of-okc-officer-highlights-benefits-of-body-cameras
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use of body cameras2. Pew found 93% support, with 66% of police officers themselves
supporting the use of body cameras3.
The call for body cameras on police brought on what Brehm and Gates (1993) refer to
as a compelling intellectual puzzle: how, and whether, to police the police. In moments
of public crisis and moral panic, such as the aftermath of the Brown shooting (and that
of many high-profile police killings since), the policy environment becomes considerably
more fluid, and enacting new policies to solve these crises becomes easier (Newswander
2012). The claims of supporters framed body cameras as the one solution that could pre-
vent another Michael Brown shooting in the future seemed, initially, to be fairly reasonable:
video and audio recordings provide an objective view of events from a police officer’s per-
spective, solving the problem of uncertainty over what actually happened in an interaction
between a police officer and a civilian (Wasserman 2014).
Despite claims to the contrary, evidence regarding the effects of body cameras was quite
limited (Drover andAriel 2015; White 2014). Fortunately, as support for body cameras in-
creased, so did scholarly interest, and the study of body cameras increased rapidly (Ariel
2017; Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland 2015; Ariel et al. 2016b; Ariel et al. 2016a; Develop-
ments in the Law 2015; Jennings, Friddell, and Lynch 2014; Jennings, Lynch, and Fridell
2015; White 2014). Unfortunately, the results of these studies, which mostly relied on vari-
ous experimental designs, are largely mixed. Today there is still no scholarly consensus on
even the simplest questions regarding body cameras and their effects on police and civilian
behavior.
This paper attempts to contribute to the on-going examination of body-worn cameras.
By taking advantage of a federal grant program from 2005, the Body-Worn Camera Pi-




forcement agencies to examine what factors lead these agencies to pursue body camera
programs–a question that, as yet, seems to be not only unanswered, but unasked–and what
effects the pursuit and implementation of body camera programs has on police officer be-
havior in the future. I argue that the public empowers police with the authority to use force
to protect the safety of civilians and other police officers, but they expect police to only use
force when necessary and in an amount that is appropriate for the situation (Ariel, Farrar,
and Sutherland 2015). Militarization–which I define as a process that involves increasing
emphasis on the use of force as an acceptable, or desirable, way to solve problems–causes
a divergence between public and police officer goals and values, creating a principal-agent
relationship (Miller 2005) where the agent, the police, favors behavior that violates the ex-
pectations of the principal, the public. More militarized police use force earlier, more often,
and more severely, resulting in more frequent civilian deaths (Lawson 2019). Unnecessary
killing of civilians violates the implicit social contract between the public and police (Pettit
1997; Rousseau 1987 [1762]; Shapiro 2003), leading to greater tension between the two
and undermining police legitimacy (King and Waddington 2004; Weitzer 2000; Weitzer
2002; Westley 1970). The public demands greater transparency and accountability, and po-
lice agencies respond by pursuing policies to provide it. Given the highly salient nature of
body cameras, that is likely to be a common policy option chosen, and police departments
should be more likely to pursue body camera programs when they kill civilians more often.
The Body-Worn Camera Pilot Implementation Program provides a useful dataset to exam-
ine this question, as it provided federal funding for police officers to create a body camera
program. In addition, police departments that received a funding grant should have killed
fewer civilians later.
In the next sections, I lay out my theory of the principal-agent problem of police vio-
lence in more detail and discuss the specific mechanisms through which body cameras may
constrain police officer behavior. Next I discuss the current state of research on body-worn
cameras and the Body-Worn Camera Pilot Implementation Program. The following section
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discusses my data and methods specifically. Next I interpret my results. The final section
offers some conclusions and implications.
5.2 THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM OF POLICE VIOLENCE
A fundamental aspect of democratic theory is that individual people concede certain
freedoms to some governmental structure in exchange for that structure’s protection of cer-
tain other rights (Hobbes 1928 [1651]; Rousseau 1987 [1762]). Americans, through local
government, endow law enforcement agencies with significant power over their lives, in-
cluding the power to take away rights that government otherwise protects, so that those
agencies (and government more broadly) may provide public goods such as safety and or-
der (Moe 1984), with the expectation that such power will be used responsibly. Police are
a party to this contract (Pettit 1997; Shapiro 2003). And, because of the nature of police
work–requiring officers to make fast decisions in complicated and tense situations–they
operate as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) with considerable discretion (Davis 1969;
Friedman 2017; LaFave 1965; Sklansky 2007; Weitzer and Tuch 2005; Wilson 1989). The
criminal procedure process defers to police discretion by default (LaFave 1974; Luna 2008-
2009; Fan 2011) and, when police officers make judgement calls on the job, others typically
ask few, if any, questions (Ginsburg 2007).
Law enforcement agencies may take away an individual’s rights if that individual is
credibly suspected of committing an offense against the behavioral norms of the society
in which the individual lives and, therefore, presents a danger to other members of the
society. In some situations, protecting the larger society from danger requires the use of
force against an individual, but there is an expectation that police officers will only use
force in those situations that require force for legitimate purposes (Alpert and Smith 1994;
Atherley and Hickman 2014; Bittner 1970). The public expects police officers to only use
lethal force when there is no other alternative. Killing a person is the most extreme form
of rights removal–removing the right to life itself–and so law enforcement agencies should
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only do so under extreme circumstances.
The process of militarization, however, affects police perceptions of when the use of
force, particularly lethal force, is appropriate. Militarization is the implementation of a
militaristic ideology, which is a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that emphasize the
use and threat of violence as an appropriate, or even desirable, way to address problems
(Kraska 2007). Police departments have a distinct subculture (Westley 1970), but differ-
ent departments and officers emphasize different aspects of that subculture (Paoline 2003;
Paoline 2004). When police departments–and their officers–become more militarized, they
begin to see the use of force as a more acceptable action when in the field (Kraska 1996;
Kraska 2007; Adelman 2003). Typically, police officers encountering a suspect choose an
initial action from a range of possible actions within a window of appropriate options that
fall on a continuum from least to most violent (Worden 2015). If the suspect complies with
the officer, the situation resolves. If the suspect resists, the officer escalates by moving
to new actions on the continuum towards the more violent end until achieving resolution.
Police that are more militarized either select an initial action closer to the more violent end
of the window of appropriate actions, or select from a window that itself moves toward the
violent end of the continuum, or both, resulting in more civilian deaths (Lawson 2019).
Militarization creates a principal-agent problem. Principal-agent theory involves an
asymmetric relation between an authority–the principal–and another party–the agent–who
the authority essentially hires to carry out one or more particular tasks for the authority
(Miller 2005). The principal expects the agent to perform its tasks to benefit the principal.
The asymmetry is in the form of both information and power. The authority has the power
to sanction the agent if necessary, but the principal is unable to directly monitor the agent’s
behavior. If the agent’s goals differ from the principal’s, the agent may pursue his or her own
goals instead, with the principal unable to effectively supervise the agent. The inability to
supervise means an inability to sanction, so the principal cannot alter the agent’s behavior.
Principal-agent models are most common in political science in studies of control of
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bureaucratic agencies, by Congress or similar legislature (Fiorina 1982; Fiorina 1986; Hill
1985; Weingast 1984; Weingast and Moran 1983), the president or similar executive (Ben-
dor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1985; Moe 1982; Wood 1988), or both (Wood and Waterman
1991). Other research examining political phenomena in a principal-agent context involves
local government contracting (Stein 1990) and the role of interest groups in policy formula-
tion (Banks andWeingast 1992). In the case of police, although prior literature that applies
a principal-agent framework to police position either internal leadership or external politi-
cal officials as principals (Brehm and Gates 1993; Chaney and Saltzstein 1998) the public
is the ultimate principal for bureaucratic agencies despite any intermediaries (McCubbins,
Noll, andWeingast 1987), police the agent. Militarization leads to diverging goals between
them. Though some past research that frames policing in the context of principal-agent
theory refers, broadly, to two outcomes: working, or police carrying out their duties, or
shirking, police spending their time at the proverbial donut shop (Brehm and Gates 1993;
Brehm and Gates 1999). Militarization introduces a third behavior option: carrying out
their duties in a way that police may prefer but that the public opposes. The public wants
police to use the minimum force necessary to carry out their function (Alpert and Smith
1994; Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland 2015; Bittner 1970), and to use lethal force only when
absolutely necessary.
Militarized police see the use of force–including lethal force–as an acceptable or de-
sirable way to address problems they encounter, and so they kill more civilians than they
would had they not become militarized. Due to the discretion police enjoy, the largely un-
supervised nature of their jobs, and the general deference to their decisions, the public has
no real means of sanctioning police for killing excessive numbers of civilians. But using
unnecessary or excessive force violates the social contract, which causes tension between
the public and police (King and Waddington 2004; Weitzer 2000; Weitzer 2002). The pub-
lic should respond to this violation through the political process, either directly to police
in the case of elected sheriffs or to appointed police chiefs through local elected officials,
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by pushing for policy changes that would constrain the behavior of police officers and pro-
mote greater accountability. Most recently, a popular policy change is the implementation
of body-worn video cameras.
5.3 SELF-AWARENESS AND DETERRENCE CONSTRAINING POLICE BEHAVIOR
The use of video cameras to both assist police and prosecutors in evidence gathering
and to capture inappropriate actions taken by police officers, though early on this involved
the use of dash-mounted video cameras in police cars4 (Alpert and McLean 2018). Dash
cameras proved to be successful, as they reduced citizen complaints and frequently cleared
officers of accusations of wrongdoing. In addition, they proved to be a useful resource for
prosecutors, with a recent survey reporting that 91% of prosecutors saying they had used
video evidence during a trial (ManTech Advanced Systems International Inc. 2012), but
dash cameras could not move. They were stuck facing the same direction as the officer’s
vehicle, so they could not capture events happening away from the front of the vehicle. To-
day, reformers, including former President Obama, advocate for a similar policy solution to
improve transparency and accountability in police-citizen interactions and to influence the
behavior of police officers and civilians during interactions: body-worn cameras (Friedman
2014). Body-worn video cameras are small devices capable of being mounted on a variety
of locations on an officer’s body–for example, a pocket, a lapel, an epaulette, etc.—and
recording audio and video more closely to a direct officer’s perspective than an in-car sys-
tem. Though they require additional resources such as training officers when and how to
record, storage and management of large amounts of video and audio data, and attention to
maintaining proper chain of custody for court proceedings, many claim body-worn cam-
eras can deter negative behaviors from officers and civilians, promote officer safety, im-
4The primary purpose for installing dash-mounted cameras in police cars was to capture evidence to use
against drunk drivers, though proponents also argued for additional benefits such as assisting with prosecu-
tion of other crimes, capturing inappropriate behavior by officers, and confirming officers’ stories regarding
interactions with the public (Alpert and McLean 2018).
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prove accountability, and reduce complaints against officers (ManTech Advanced Systems
International Inc. 2012).
Advocates of body-worn camera policies as a beneficial reform, and scholars who study
the effects of these cameras (see below), focus on two theoretical mechanisms from social
psychology: self-awareness and deterrence (Adams and Mastracci 2017; Ariel 2017; Ariel,
Farrar, and Sutherland 2015; Ariel et al. 2016b; Ariel et al. 2018; Surette 2005). Both
mechanisms involve social surveillance affecting individual behavior due to individual’s
knowledge that he or she is being watched. The obvious presence of video cameras leads
to heightened self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund 1972; Gervais and Norenzayan 2012;
Wicklund 1975), which is the process of focusing one’s own attention on oneself (Mead
1934), and more socially desirable behavior (Paulhus 1988; Sproull et al. 1996). Scholars
find this effect across a variety of specific stimuli, including live audiences, mirrors, and
cameras (Buss 1980; Carver and Scheier 1978; Davis and Brock 1975; Davis and Franzoi
1991; Geller and Shaver 1976; Morin 2002) and even species (Chartrand and Bargh 1999;
Dzieweczynski, Eklund, and Rowland 2006; Jones and Nesbitt 1971). Being observed
creates a greater need to follow rules (Barclay 2004; Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck
2002; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002), so people will comply with expected social norms
if they know that someone is watching (Morin 2004; Morin 2011; Munger and Harris 1989),
even if that someone is an inanimate video camera with no other person able to directly see
the footage (Adair 1984; Sherman 1990).
Self-awareness explains a possible mechanism through which the public may constrain
police and civilian behavior during interactions between the two, but more self-awareness
may prevent police from engaging in inappropriate behavior through a deterrence effect.
According to deterrence theory, people are less likely to engage in socially and/or morally
unacceptable behavior if the likelihood of being caught and the potential severity of pun-
ishment are both high (Nagin 2013; Von Hirsch et al. 1999). Most people prefer to avoid
negative consequences, so they will alter their behavior if the chance of experiencing neg-
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ative consequences is high (Klepper and Nagin 2006; Nagin 2013). However, there must
be apparent signals to suggest that apprehension is likely for the prospect of punishment to
deter unacceptable behavior. Affecting the behavior of police officers, operating with wide
discretion and little to no supervision, requires a clear mechanism through which they may
be caught committing unacceptable acts. Requiring officers to wear a device that records
video and audio from their perspective during interactions with civilians likely qualifies as
a credible threat of apprehension (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989). Scholars find a similar
mechanism regarding cameras and potential criminal offenders (Wikstrom et al. 2012).
Police officers wearing body cameras should be well aware that their actions are being
recorded. This self-awareness should encourage officers to engage in behavior they be-
lieve to be acceptable. Officers that are more likely to engage in misconduct should also be
affected, because cameras introduce a greater likelihood of superiors discovering their mis-
conduct. This combined self-awareness and deterrence effect should lead to fewer uses of
lethal force, and fewer civilian deaths, in departments that require the use of body cameras.
Additionally, police departments with officers that kill civilians more often should experi-
ence a political backlash from citizens under that department’s jurisdiction, as unnecessary
and excessive use of force violate the social contract, leading to increased tension between
the public and police (King and Waddington 2004; Weitzer 2000; Weitzer 2002). Such
violations can threaten the public’s belief in the legitimacy of police (Westley 1970). The
backlash should move from the citizens to their elected officials, then to police leaders5, and
from police leaders it should travel down to the rank-and-file officers. Those departments
should pursue body camera programs as a way to constrain officer behavior and show the
public a desire to improve accountability. Specifically, my hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: Police departments should be more likely to pursue and implement body-
worn camera programs as the number of civilians the department’s officers kill increases.
5In the case of elected sheriffs, political backlash should move directly from citizens to police leadership.
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Hypothesis 2: Police departments that adopt body-worn camera programs should kill
fewer civilians after implementing the program than departments without a body-worn cam-
era program.
5.4 THE STATE OF RESEARCH ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS
When the salience of body-worn cameras with the public and policymakers greatly in-
creased after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown (Sanburn 2014; Wasserman 2014), re-
search on their effects was essentially nonexistent. Since then, the study of body-worn
cameras accelerated as police departments all over the US implemented body-worn camera
programs (Alpert and McLean 2018), and elected officials, police leaders, and scholars re-
alized that such programs were spreading rapidly despite little understanding of how to use
these cameras appropriately or the potential for negative consequences (Coudert, Butin, and
Le Metayer 2015; Mateescu, Rosenblat, and Boyd 2015). The current state of research on
the effects of body-worn cameras is conflicted. The bulk of research uses experimental de-
signs focused on one or a small number of police departments. However, these studies seem
to rely uponweakmethodology to test the effects of body-worn cameras (Cubitt et al. 2016).
The earliest apparent study of body-worn camera effects was a randomized controlled trial
in Rialto, CA, which found positive results: the authors reported officers assigned to wear
cameras during a shift were less likely to use force, and the number of complaints against
officers declined significantly (Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland 2015; Farrar 2013). Cameras
also reduced the use of force in other experimental research (Jennings, Lynch, and Fridell
2015; Owens, Mann, and McKenna 2014). Additional work from outside the US supported
the finding that body-worn cameras may reduce civilian complaints, but found no evidence
of different treatment of civilians by police (Grossmith et al. 2015).
However, there is also research that finds cameras have no effect on the use of force
(Ariel 2017; Ariel et al. 2016b; Katz et al. 2014; Yokum, Ravishankar, and Coppock 2017)
and that it increases how frequently police use force (Ariel et al. 2016a). Importantly, Ariel
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et al. (2016b) and (Ariel et al. 2018) found a positive effect of body-worn cameras on the
likelihood of police officers being the targets of assault, rather than the perpetrators. There
is also work that failed to replicate a reduction in complaints against officers (Yokum, Rav-
ishankar, and Coppock 2017). Still more research concludes that cameras reduce citizen
complaints about the use of force, but increase the likelihood of complaints against offi-
cer misconduct (Ariel 2017). While some claim that improve public perceptions of police,
others find mixed results (Cubitt et al. 2016).
Overall evidence of the effects of body-worn cameras on policing is weak (Cubitt et al.
2016), which may explain the wide variation in results. Research primarily relies on experi-
ments or reviews of experiments in one or more locations that likely vary in generalizability.
Moreover, several experiments involved what seem to be design choices that introduce po-
tential bias. For example, (Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland 2015) take the police shift as a unit
of analysis, randomly assigning officers to experimental or control shifts. Officers could
have worked shifts in both conditions, which could have altered treatment effects. It is
also possible that conducting experimental tests of body cameras causes a Hawthorne ef-
fect because officers are aware that they are in a treatment group, and their actions are being
recorded (Alpert and McLean 2018). Finally, there appears to be little to no research exam-
ining why police departments implement body camera programs, likely due to the inability
to control conditions that may lead to such implementation experimentally.
In pursuit of evidence for or against body-worn camera effects, observational studies
involving police who are not acting as a part of an experiment could also be useful. Aggre-
gating to the police department as the unit of analysis could also be beneficial, because the
conflicted findings of prior experimental research–which uses individual officers or shifts
as the unite of analysis–may suggest, similar to other findings on the importance of police
department culture (Brehm and Gates 1993), that police department culture has an effect
on how individual officers behave with or without cameras. However, an observational
study requires at least approximate knowledge of when various police departments began
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their body-worn camera programs so that the researcher(s) can collect appropriate data on
potential causal factors and effects. In the following section, I discuss the Department of
Justice’s 2015 Body-Worn Camera Pilot Implementation Program, which awarded funding
to law enforcement agencies for the implementation of body-worn camera programs, as
it provides information on when police departments began these programs, which police
departments applied for and received a grant, and the amounts requested and received.
5.4.1 THE 2015 BODY-WORN CAMERA PILOT IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM
In 2015 the US Department of Justice announced the Body-Worn Camera Pilot Imple-
mentation Program, a competitive grant program that solicited applications from local law
enforcement agencies for grant funding to create a body-worn camera program. According
to the program’s solicitation announcement, the intent was to provide assistance towards
developing, implementing, and evaluating body cameras as a way to improve interactions
between police and the public and build public trust in police. The program also required
grant recipients to develop policies and practices to facilitate the effective adoption of a
body camera program that addressed the purchasing and maintenance of equipment, data
storage, and concerns over the privacy rights of citizens. The program also required recip-
ients to provide an in-kind or cash match of 50%, with expenses such as data storage costs
or expenses incurred by partner programs such as prosecutors. Agencies could apply for a
grant under one of four categories. Category 1 included large police departments employing
1,000 or more sworn officers and set a maximum funding request of $1.2 million. Category
2 applied to mid-sized agencies with more than 250 but less than 1,000 sworn officers. This
category’s maximum request was $600,000. Category 3 applied to small agencies of less
than 250 sworn officers, and set a maximum request at $250,000. The Bureau of Justice
Assistance expected to make a total of four awards to category 1, twelve to category 2, and
sixteen to category 3, providing a mix of department sizes. Agencies were also required
to commit to deploying at least 25 cameras total. Category 4 applied to agencies with pre-
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existing body camera programs seeking to expand those programs, and limited requests to
$250,000. Of a total of 285 applications, fewer than 50 were in category 4 and less than
one-third of those applications received awards. While agencies attempting to expand body
camera programs could apply for a grant, the program solicitation specified that the focus
of the grant was for implementing new body camera programs.
Applications had to include a project abstract of 400 words or less, a program narrative
of no more than 20 double-spaced pages, a budget detail worksheet written on a standard
form, a budget narrative, a disclosure of the agency’s “high risk” status with another fed-
eral grant-making agency if applicable, a letter of intent, a timeline of expected milestones,
several other standard forms, and a disclosure of agency lobbying activities. The abstract
was to be written for a general audience with permission to share the abstract publicly. The
program narrative was to include separate sections that stated the problem for which the
agency intended the grant, a description of how the agency would design and implement
the body camera program, agency capabilities and competencies regarding a body camera
program, an explanation of how the agency intended to continue the program beyond the
grant, and a plan for collected performance measurements. The budget narrative was to de-
scribe each category of expected expense in the detail worksheet, with attention paid to cost
effectiveness. For review purposes, the selection criteria consisted of the budget narrative
and program narrative only, and each application went through a peer-review process.
285 agencies in 42 states andWashington, DC, applied for a grant through this program.
Total requests amounted to more than $56 million. A total of 73 agencies across all four cat-
egories received a grant award, exceeding the initial goal of awarding 50 agencies. Award
amounts totaled almost $20 million and 21,000 cameras.
I obtained data on applicants and awardees to the programs through a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request I submitted to Justice Department’s Office of Justice Programs. These
data included each applicant, the total amount requested, and the amount awarded for agen-
cies that received an award. The Justice Department announced award winners in Septem-
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ber, 2015.
5.5 DATA AND METHODS
I have, essentially, two hypotheses. The first is that agencies responsible for more civil-
ian deaths should have been more likely to apply for, and receive, a grant award. The sec-
ond is that agencies that apply for, or receive, a grant award should be responsible for fewer
deaths later. The dependent variable for the first hypothesis is a binary variable indicating
whether an agency received a grant, from the data I obtained through FOIA request. For
the second hypothesis, the dependent variable is the number of civilian deaths for which the
agency was responsible in 2016, the year after the grant program. I obtained 2016 deaths
from the Fatal Encounters database, a project that contains a comprehensive list of civilians
killed by police in the US from 2000-2016. The database also includes information about
each civilian including age, gender, race, and the agency responsible for the death.
The unit of analysis is the law enforcement agency. To construct the database, I begin
with the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, which
includes about 3,000 law enforcement agencies. I matched the remaining agencies in these
data to agencies that pursued and received a body camera grant and to the total civilian
deaths of each agency in 2014, 2015, 2016. The dataset contains a total of 2,189 observa-
tions, of which 113 applied for a grant and 36 of those received a grant. Summary statistics
for all variables are in Table 5.1.
5.5.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In the first hypothesis, the primary independent variable is the number of civilian deaths
for which the agency was responsible in 2014, the year before the grant program. This
measure is also from the Fatal Encounters project. For the second hypothesis, the primary
independent variables are binary variables indicating whether an agency applied for, and
received, a grant. These measures should capture the theoretical process that I described
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previously: agencies that kill more civilians should be more likely to apply for and receive a
grant as a response to political backlash from the public. Agencies that apply for and receive
a grant should kill fewer civilians in the future, as pursuing a body camera program acts
as a signal to street-level officers that the frequent use of lethal force is not an acceptable
behavior.
5.5.2 CONTROL VARIABLES
To account for other potential factors that could influence either the likelihood of re-
ceiving a grant or the number of civilian deaths, I include several control variables in my
analyses.
Amount requested. It seems obvious that a potential factor that could influence
whether a police department received a grant is the total amount of money the agency re-
quested. While the program set maximum requests by category, the Justice Department
may have been more likely to award grants to agencies requesting smaller amounts, to both
minimize the potential loss if an agency failed to implement a body camera program (though
there appears to be no evidence of this happening) and to spread available funds around to
more awards. To account for this possibility, I use the natural log of the dollar amount each
applicant requested.
Racial demographics. Given the recent and highly-salient racial element of the con-
troversies over police use of force in recent years, the grant program could have been a
way to signal a desire for more amicable relations between police departments and minor-
ity communities. Departments may have been more likely to request and receive a grant
if the population within their jurisdiction was less White and, specifically, more Black and
Latino/a. To measure minority racial groups, I use the proportion of the population within a
police department’s jurisdiction that was Latino/a and the proportion that was Black. These
data come fromAmerican Community Survey estimates.
County-wide jurisdiction. As mentioned previously, the effect of political backlash
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should be more direct in the case of law enforcement agencies with elected sheriffs in the
lead rather than appointed chiefs, because it avoids the local political officials in the mid-
dle. As most police departments with county-wide jurisdiction are sheriff’s offices, these
agencies she be more responsive to changes in public opinion, such as political responses
to relatively frequent civilian deaths. I measure this as a binary variable where 1 indicates
the agency has county-wide jurisdiction, from the 2013 LEMAS survey.
Financial flexibility. Though it is hard to imagine any bureaucratic agency preferring
to spend its own money rather than someone else’s, it is still possible that agencies with
considerable financial resources may prefer to pay for the implementation of a body camera
program using their own funds rather than apply for a grant that would be subject to Justice
Department oversight and various regulations. I could measure financial flexibility as the
department’s budget, but a more valid measure would be budget dollars for each sworn
officer, as that seems to better reflect the concept of flexibility. These data come from the
2013 LEMAS survey.
Previous adoption of camera technology. Some police departments may be more
likely to adopt new technology if they already make use of similar technology. Departments
that use dash-mounted video cameras, to which proponents of body cameras have often
made comparison, might pursue a body-worn camera program due to its similarity and
apparent improvement in technology. I measure this as a binary variable indicating whether
a police department uses video cameras in patrol cars. This measure comes from the 2013
LEMAS survey, which indicates that about 71% of police departments surveyed use these
cameras.
Prior year deaths. When attempting to measure the impact of body camera programs
on deaths in the year following receipt of a grant, it seems reasonable to control for the
number of people a police department killed in the previous year. Police departments are
likely to kill roughly the same number of civilians year to year, ceteris paribus, and that
number is probably different for different departments. In addition to 2014 deaths by agency
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in themodel examining factors that affect whether police departments pursue body cameras,
I include 2015 deaths, also from the Fatal Encounters project, in the model that examines
the effect of receiving a grant on future deaths.
Current body camera program. It seems obvious that police departments that already
have body cameras would be less likely to apply for a grant intended to facilitate the im-
plementation of body camera programs, even if the grant program allowed departments to
apply for a grant to expand or enhance an existing body camera program. The 2013 LEMAS
survey includes a question asking whether police departments use cameras on officers as
of January 1, 2013. I code this question as a binary variable.
5.5.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION
Because receiving a grant requires police departments to self-select by applying for it,
the selection is non-random and statistical modeling must account for the selection process
to avoid biased estimates. In the dataset, observations that did not apply for a grant could
not receive a grant, so the dependent variable is censored for those observations. I use a
Heckman selection model to properly incorporate the two-stage process that results in a
truncated dataset6 (Heckman 1976; Heckman 1979). Essentially, it does so by estimating
two models. The first model is a probit that includes all complete agency observations, and
the dependent variable is whether the agency applied for a grant. The first stage independent
variables are the number of civilians the agency killed in 2014, the population and the
proportion of the population that is Black and Latino/a within each agency’s jurisdiction
in 2014, the agency’s budget dollars per full time officer, whether the agency has county-
wide jurisdiction, whether the agency currently uses body cameras, and whether the agency
currently uses dash cameras in patrol cars. The second model is also a probit7, includes only
6For alternative specifications that involve two separate models, see the appendix.
7Similar to Plumper, Schneider, and Troeger (2006), who also use a Heckman selection model to examine
self-selected application and accession.
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complete observations of agencies that applied for a grant, and the dependent variable is
whether an agency received a grant. The independent variables in the second stage include
all first stage variables except whether the agency currently uses dash-mounted cameras
and body cameras, and adds the natural log of the grant amount the agency requested when
applying. In all models, I cluster the standard errors by county to account for unobserved
geographic variation.
To determine whether receiving a grant affected the future number of deaths, I use a
negative binomial regression, which is appropriate for overly-dispersed count data. The
dependent variable is the number of deaths in 2016, the year after the BWCPIP grant pro-
gram. The independent variables are whether the department received a grant, the number
of deaths in 2015, the total population and Black and Latino/a proportions of the popula-
tions within each agency’s jurisdiction in 2015, the agency’s budget dollars per full time
officer, and whether the agency as county-wide jurisdiction. This model includes 2,202
police department observations. I also cluster the standard errors of this model by county.
5.6 RESULTS
5.6.1 EFFECT OF DEATHS ON PURSUIT OF BODY CAMERAS
The results of the Heckman model are in Table 5.2. Note that the ρ parameter is statis-
tically significant, suggesting the presence of a selection effect. These results offer partial
support for my theoretical argument. In the first stage, I find a positive and significant
(p < 0.01) association between the number of civilians a police department killed in 2014
and the probability of the department applying for the BWCPIPgrant in 2015. This suggests
support for the theoretical claim that the public applies political pressure to leaders as police
officers killed more people and, therefore, violate the social contract between police and
the public. Interestingly, I find a negative and significant (p < 0.000) association between a
department having county-wide jurisdiction and the probability of applying. This suggests
that having county-wide jurisdiction reduced the probability of a police department apply-
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ing for the grant. It seems plausible that the direct electoral connection between citizens and
sheriffs, who are the leaders of most county-wide law enforcement agencies, reduced the
agency’s need to demonstrate accountability to the public through adopting body cameras,
while local elected officials pressured appointed police leaders to pursue these programs to
signal that pursuit of accountability.
On a similar note, the Black and Latino/a proportions of populations also had a positive
and significant association (p < 0.000) with the probability of applying. As these groups
are over-represented among police killings, agencies may intend the pursuit and adoption of
body camera programs as away to improve relations between police and those communities,
especially when those communities are large enough to be influential voting blocs. There
is also a positive and significant association(p < 0.05) between total population and the
probability of applying for a grant. It is possible that, as populations become larger, citizens
feel more disconnected from police. The disconnect leads to the pursuit of mechanisms to
constrain officer behavior, such as the pursuit of body cameras.
I also find a positive and significant (p < 0.000) association between a department’s
operating budget dollars per officer and the probability of applying for a grant. This rela-
tionship is particularly interesting because it is the opposite of my initial expectation. More
intuitively, police departments that already used body cameras were significantly less likely
to apply (p < 0.05). Using cameras in patrol cars did not have any significant effect on the
probability of applying.
However, it is impossible to directly interpret the coefficients of a probit model. Sub-
stantive interpretation requires the calculation of predicted quantities. Figure 5.1 depicts
the marginal effects of each variable on the probability of a police department applying
for a BWCPIP grant. Each civilian death in 2014 increased the expected probability of a
department applying for a grant by around 0.5%, which supports my theoretical argument
that police departments that kill more civilians should be more likely to pursue body cam-
era programs. Although this may seem like a relatively small effect, the largest number of
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deaths in the dataset is 32; according to the model, these deaths represent an increase of
16% in the probability that a police department applied for a body camera grant.
The only significant variables in the second stage model are the Black and Latino/a pro-
portions of the population, but both are negative (p < 0.000, p < 0.05, respectively). This
seems to suggest that police departments with larger Black or Latino/a populations were
more likely to apply for a grant but less likely to receive a grant. This appears counter-
intuitive, but it is possible that only applying for a grant served as a strong enough signal
without actually receiving it. Alternatively, officials responsible for deciding award recip-
ients may have acted as agents of another racial group, most likely Whites. The number
of 2014 deaths failed to achieve significance, but the significant and positive association in
the first stage model means that, potentially, deaths may still have a substantively positive
effect on the likelihood of a department receiving a grant if they applied for one.
Again, I cannot directly interpret the coefficients of the model beyond sign and signif-
icance. Figure 5.2 depicts the marginal effects of each second stage variable on the condi-
tional probability of a department receiving a grant if it applied for one. Despite the lack
of statistical significance in the second stage model, the marginal effect of civilian deaths
in 2014 is also positive and significant. Each additional death increased the conditional
probability of receiving a grant buy about 8%, again supporting the theoretical argument.
5.6.2 EFFECTS OF GRANT ON FUTURE DEATHS
The second question of interest is what, if any, effect receiving a BWCPIP grant has on
future civilian deaths. Table 5.3 depicts the results. Most importantly, the model shows a
positive and significant (p < 0.000) association between receiving a grant and the number
of people police departments killed in the following year8. This finding contradicts the
theoretical expectation that receiving a grant to facilitate the implementation of a body
8Estimating the model with the variable indicating whether a police department applied for a grant, rather
than whether it received the grant, yields similar results. See the appendix.
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camera program would trigger increased self-awareness and deterrence effects that would
constrain police officer behavior and result in fewer deaths. Instead, receiving the grant
seems to have led to more deaths.
The Black and Latino/a population proportions in 2015, the number of civilian deaths
in 2015, and budget dollars per officer are also positive and significantly (p < 0.000) as-
sociated with the number of civilian deaths in 2016. Having county-wide jurisdiction is
significant and negative (p < 0.01). The total population did not achieve significance.
Figure 5.3 displays total civilian deaths averaged across police departments, by whether
the department applied and received a BWCPIP grant. Among police departments that did
not apply for a grant, civilian deaths remained, on average, almost zero across all three
years. Civilian deaths associated with police departments that applied for, but did not re-
ceive, a grant begin slightly higher than departments that did not apply and increase slightly
in 2015 and 2016, but the change is quite small. However, for departments that applied and
received a grant, deaths were considerably higher–at an average of almost three per depart-
ment in 2014. Deaths declined to around two per department in 2015, the year of the grant
program, before increasing again to around 2.5 per department in 2016, the year after the
department received the grant.
The trend shown in this graph, like the model results, contradict the theoretical expec-
tation of the effect of body cameras on future deaths. These results seem to suggest that
applying for and receiving a grant to implement body cameras served as little more than
a method of virtue signaling: it allowed police departments to communicate to the public
that they favored improving transparency and accountability among police officers without
a resulting decrease in deaths except for the year in which the grant program occurred.
5.7 CONCLUSION
This paper represents what may be the first attempt at a study of police body cameras in
two ways. First, I attempt to examine what factors increase police departments’motivation
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to implement body-worn camera programs. I argue that police pursue body camera pro-
grams as a response to public backlash that increases with the number of civilians police
kill. The public empowers police with the lawful authority to use force, including lethal
force, but expects police to use force, especially lethal force, only when absolutely neces-
sary and only in least amount necessary to accomplish lawful goals such as maintaining
public order. When police become more militarized, they see the use of force as more ac-
ceptable or even more desirable, which creates a principal-agent problem between citizens
and the police and leads police to use force, including lethal force, more often. This results
in more frequent civilian deaths and a political backlash from the public, which leads police
departments to pursue policy changes intended to improve transparency and accountability
and placate the public.
Second, I contribute to the emerging literature on the effects of body cameras by exam-
ining the effect the implementation of body camera programs has on future civilian deaths.
I argue, consistent with a robust literature in social psychology, that knowledge that one
is being watched leads to heightened self-awareness. That self-awareness, combined with
an increased chance of being caught and punished for engaging in unacceptable behavior,
creates a deterrent effect that should constrain police officer behavior. As street-level bu-
reaucrats who typically operate unsupervised in the field, forcing the use of devices that
record audio and video of civilian interactions should present a strong signal that inappro-
priate behavior will result in punishment, which would create a new incentive to avoid using
force except when necessary.
To test these arguments, I take advantage of the Justice Department’s 2015 Body-Worn
Camera Pilot Implementation Program, a competitive grant that allowed law enforcement
agencies to request funding to implement or expand a body-worn camera program. Using
a Heckman selection model to account for the effects of self-selection by choosing to apply
for a grant, my results suggest partial support for my theoretical argument. The number of
deaths in the prior year seems to have had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood
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of a police department applying for and receiving a grant through this program. However,
receiving a grant not only seems to have failed to reduce future civilian deaths, I find a
positive association between the two: police departments in 2016, the year after the grant
program, killed more people if they received an award than if they did not.
It is plausible that this is, still, a matter of street-level discretion. Even if police de-
partments implement a body-worn camera program, the effectiveness of such a program–in
other words, whether body cameras really cause increased self-awareness and deter unde-
sirable behavior— depends on whether the video recordings actually serve as a means to
“catch” and then sanction officers for engaging in undesirable behavior. Otherwise, body
cameras become, at best, a tool to facilitate gathering evidence against civilians for crimi-
nal prosecution but not against police officers for the same and, at worst, a cynical tactic to
improve police legitimacy without leading to any positive effects, such as changing the be-
haviors that damaged that legitimacy in the first place. As recent events have shown, police
still generally receive a great deal of deference to their decisions within the criminal justice
system, even when video evidence seems to show clearly inappropriate behavior (McBride
andWinsor 2016; Chavez, Egel, and Chabria 2018). An important caveat to note is that this
observational study, while sacrificing less generalizability than prior body camera research,
sacrifices more causality than the experimental design-driven work of criminology scholars
over the last several years. Overall, research on all aspects of body-worn cameras is still
in its infancy, and scholars may eventually reach a consensus that body cameras produce
positive effects. But, considering many police department policies specifically prohibit or
limit the use of body camera footage to evaluate and/or discipline officers (Fan 2018), it
seems unlikely that body camera programs will lead to any significant reduction in deaths.
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5.8 TABLES
Table 5.1 Chapter 5 Summary Statistics
Variable Min Mean Max Std. Deviation
Awarded Grant 0 0.319 1 0.468
Applied for Grant 0 0.052 1 0.221
2014 Deaths 0 0.314 32 1.483
2015 Deaths 0 0.291 33 1.358
2016 Deaths 0 0.306 21 1.201
2014 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.009 11.865 997.420 40.125
2015 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.010 12.021 1003.839 40.451
Percent Black (2014) 0 11.920 97.300 15.900
Percent Black (2015) 0 11.995 96.400 15.979
Percent Latino/a (2014) 0 13.637 100 17.267
Percent Latino/a (2015) 0 13.807 100 17.358
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 1.917 13.403 140.00 7.773
Amount Requested (logged) 8.700 11.967 13.998 1.196
Current Body Camera Program 0 0.295 1 0.456
Dash Cameras 0 0.743 1 0.437
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Table 5.2 Heckman Probit, effect of deaths on probability of applying for grant
Probit model Selection model
2014 Deaths 0.092(0.069) 0.076(0.028)**
2014 Population (divided by 10,000) -0.002(0.001) 0.002(0.001)*
Percent Black (2014) -0.023(0.006)*** 0.017(0.002)***
Percent Latino/a (2014) -0.015(0.006)* 0.008(0.002)***
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) -0.020(0.016) 0.021(0.006)***
Countywide 0.105(0.503) -0.793(0.175)***
Amount Requested (logged) 0.116(0.085) -
Current Body Camera Program - -0.282(0.114)*
Dash Cameras - 0.171(0.107)
(Intercept) 0.760(1.256) -2.324(0.145)***
ρ -0.812(0.197)*
N 2,189 (113 uncensored)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 26.36 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV =Whether department received grant
Selection = Whether department applied for grant
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2015 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.006(0.005)
Percent Black (2015) 0.020(0.003)***
Percent Latino/a (2015) 0.012(0.003)***





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 260.81
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Number of deaths in 2016
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5.9 FIGURES
Figure 5.1 Marginal effects of variables on Pr(Applied)
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Figure 5.2 Marginal effects of variables on Pr(Received | Applied)
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In the preceding chapters, I walked through a theory and empirical tests of the causes
and consequences of police militarization. Chapter 1 described several high-profile inci-
dents of civilian deaths under questionable or outright illegal circumstances at the hands of
police. These incidents, and the many others since the shooting of Michael Brown in 2014,
set off a debate over the role of police, what behaviors are unacceptable or not, what milita-
rization actually is, what whether militarization is responsible for the string of killings that
brought policing to such a salient position in the public. Chapter 2 provided an overview
of my theory, defined militarization, and explained the way I operationalize both milita-
rization and police killings. Chapter 3 presented the first part of my argument in detail and
performed an empirical test. In Chapter 3, I argue that militarization is a police response
to increased threat they perceive from minority racial groups within their jurisdiction. In
short, I argue that police militarize more as the non-White proportion of the population
within their jurisdiction increases. However, I also argue this relationship should reverse
once the minority proportion reaches a critical mass, a size at which the minority group
is large enough to affect police behavior. In Chapter 4, I argue that militarization affects
police officer behavior by shifting their preferences in interactions with civilians toward
more violence, leading to lethal force more quickly and more often. The result is that more
militarized police should kill more people. Finally, in Chapter 5, I argue that militarized
police using lethal force when it is not necessary violates a social contract between police
and the public. The public should demand policy changes to constrain police behavior and
facilitate a better ability to monitor police officers. Given the high salience of body-worn
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video cameras, those are a likely choice of policy solution. Further, police departments that
adopt body cameras should kill fewer people.
Empirically, I find support for much of my argument. Analyses in Chapter 3 find a
positive association between the non-White, specifically Black and Latino/a, population
proportions and militarization, but the association becomes negative once those propor-
tions reach a certain size–around 50% for non-White and Latino/a, and around 36% for
Black. In Chapter 4, I find a positive association between militarization and the number of
civilians police kill. As my theory argued, more militarized police kill more people. Chap-
ter 5 tests two questions: whether police that kill more people are more likely to pursue,
and implement, body camera programs, and whether police departments that adopt body
camera programs kill fewer police in the future. Results in this chapter are mixed. I find a
positive association between the number of civilians a police department killed in 2014 and
the probability that the department applied for a Body-Worn Camera Pilot Implementation
Program grant in 2015. In addition, I find a positive association between the number of
civilian deaths in 2014 and the probability that a department received a grant. However, I
also find that police departments that received a grant in 2015 killed more civilians in 2016,
not fewer.
To sum up, police militarize when the populations they serve are lessWhite, specifically
more Black and/or Latino/a, until the minority proportion(s) reach a large enough size to
affect police behavior to their benefit. Militarized police departments kill more people.
Police departments that kill more people are more likely to pursue body camera policies to
signal a desire for greater transparency and accountability to the public, but police seem to
take the adoption of body cameras as essentially no threat. It is plausible that police use
body cameras as a public relations move rather than a sincere attempt to reduce unnecessary
force. Regardless, police departments that received a BWCPIP grant in 2015 killed more
civilians in 2016, all else equal.
These findingsmake important contributions to the study of policing. First, they provide
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empirical evidence to support claims of racial bias in policing and militarization. Second,
they also provide evidence to inform the debate on the use of force by police. Third, my
results include one of, if not the, first attempts to examine the reasons police departments
implement body camera policies. Fourth, I provide what may be the first national study of
the effects of body cameras using observational data rather than a randomized controlled
trial.
A common thread weaving through many discussions of these topics is the legitimacy
of police agencies. We empower police with significant authority to take away the rights of
citizens, up to and including the right to life. Police behavior that appears associated with
militarization, such as racial bias and the unnecessary and excessive use of force, undermine
that legitimacy and threaten police departments’ ability to perform their function in society.
Law enforcement in any society is a necessary endeavor. Governments of all types enact
laws to promote collective benefits such as stability and safety. Policing is an important
part of that. But police also have important responsibilities in addition to their author-
ity and discretion: they must carry out their duties with the minimum amount of violence
and disruption necessary so that in protecting safety and stability they do not inadvertently
threaten both. As scholars of politics and government, political scientists must discover the
factors that affect police behavior and how to mitigate negative behavior, because police
are a fundamental arm of government and, therefore, of society. This dissertation provides
a foundation for that study, but considerable work remains.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 3
A.1 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
This section presents the results of alternative specifications of Models 1 and 2. Table
A.1 depicts the results of a negative binomial model. The results of this model largely
supports those of the main analysis; the association between the non-White proportion and
militarization is curvilinear, positive initially but becoming negative as the proportion grows
larger. The Latino/a proportion follows a similar pattern. While the association of the Black
proportion with militarization is positive, it is not significant. The squared term, however,
is negative and significant.
The results ofA.2 offer additional, though also partial, support for the results of the main
analysis in Poisson regression models. The association between the non-White proportion
and militarization is similarly curvilinear, as is the association between the Latino/a propor-
tion and militarization. The Black proportion loses significance and the signs of both terms
are reversed. However, given the highly over-dispersed nature of the dependent variable,
the negative binomial model is more appropriate. This is likely the cause of the loss of
significance. Zero-inflated Poisson regression models, in Tables A.3 and A.4, offer similar
results to the Poisson regressions. The non-White proportion’s association is curvilinear, as
is the association of the Latino/a proportion, but again the Black proportion is insignificant.
Recall that the zero-inflated negative binomial regression assumes two zero-generation
processes. In the case of the 1033 program, those are 1) a police department does not join
the program and 2) a police department joins the program but does not request equipment.
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Though I justify the use of a ZINB model by explaining the low cost of joining the 1033
program, it may seem unlikely that a department would join the program and then not take
advantage of it. Alternatively, a hurdle regression model assumes only one zero-generation
process. This model assumes that any police officer that joins the 1033 program will re-
ceive equipment, and the zeros are agencies that do not join the program. Tables A.5 and
A.6 depict the results of two hurdle regressions. The non-White proportion’s association
remains curvilinear, as does the Black proportion. The Latino/a proportion’s association
with militarization becomes insignificant.
Finally, Table A.7 shows the results of OLS regression models with standard errors
clustered by county. The results are substantively similar to those of the hurdle regressions.
However, it is worth noting that the nature of the dependent variable means essentially all
assumptions of the OLS regression model are violated. This model is included for the sake
of completeness only.
A.2 ALTERNATIVE DV TRANSFORMATIONS
The models in this section use different transformations of the dependent variable, mil-
itarization represented by the value of 1033 program equipment. Table A.8 depict logit
models with a binary dependent variable, where observations where militarization is greater
than 0 are coded as 1, 0 otherwise. The non-White proportion’s association remains curvi-
linear, but coefficients are not sigificant. Similarly, the specific racial groups are also not
significant. This seems to suggest that racial demographics may not affect whether a police
department militarizes at all, though previous results suggest that demographics affect the
extent to which police departments militarize.
TableA.9 shows an OLS regressionmodel with the natural log of the militarizationmea-
sure as the dependent variable. The results for the non-White proportion remain the same,
but the specific racial groups are insignificant. While it may seem more appropriate to use
this model in the main analysis due to its simplicity, I do not for several reasons. First,
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a log transformation means that the original variable must increase by larger and larger
amounts as it grows larger to affect the natural log’s value. If the value of military equip-
ment represents the same “amount” of militarization regardless of how much equipment a
police department already has, then a log transformation is inappropriate. Second, taking
the natural log of zero is impossible, so including the zeros requires adding one dollar to
every observation. Essentially, this eliminates all zeros from the models. Those zeros are
important theoretically because they represent no militarization; eliminating them seems
counterproductive. Finally, calculating predicted values from a logged dependent variable
is more difficult. I use models that, while more complicated, allow for the generation of
more easily-understood predicted values.
Finally, to compare my measure of militarization with at least one alternative measure
that does not involve 1033 program equipment, I ran a negative binomial regression using
the variables of the general threat model, but with the dependent variable as the number
of SWAT team deployments in Maryland during 2014. Maryland state law required law
enforcement agencies to track data on SWAT team deployments during the state’s fiscal
years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. I obtained these data and merged the FY 2014
SWATdeployments with my data on agencies inMaryland in 2014. The SWATdata include
over 800 deployments from 31 agencies. Unfortunately, due to missing agencies from the
LEMAS survey data, there are only 15 usable observations. The results of the negative
binomial regression are in Table A.10. These results largely match the substantive conclu-
sions of the main analysis. I find a positive, significant (p < 0.05) association between
the non-White population proportion and the number of SWAT deployments in Maryland
in 2014. The squared term is also negative and significant (p < 0.05), which matches the
results from the general threat model in the main analysis. While I must recognize that the
SWAT deployment data include only one state and result in only 15 complete observations,




Table A.1 NB Regressions, General and Specific Threat models
General Threat model Specific Threat model
Percent Non-White 0.063(0.011)*** -
Percent Non-White2 -0.001(0.000)*** -
Percent Black - 0.022(0.013)
Percent Black2 - -0.000(0.000)*
Percent Latino/a - 0.059(0.012)***
Percent Latino/a2 - -0.001(0.000)***
Percent Asian - 0.032(0.042)
Percent Asian2 - -0.001(0.001)
South 0.578(0.157)*** 0.680(0.164)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.008(0.004)* 0.006(0.005)
Percent Poverty -0.015(0.014) -0.011(0.014)
Violent Crime Rate 0.005(0.003) 0.009(0.004)*





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(9) = 60.42 Wald χ2(13) = 124.66
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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Table A.2 Poisson Regressions, General and Specific Threat models
General Threat model Specific Threat model
Percent Non-White 0.085(0.024)*** -
Percent Non-White2 -0.001(0.000)*** -
Percent Black - -0.003(0.020)
Percent Black2 - 0.000(0.000))
Percent Latino/a - 0.065(0.022)**
Percent Latino/a2 - -0.001(0.000)**
Percent Asian - 0.119(0.062)
Percent Asian2 - -0.004(0.003)
South -0.020(0.287) 0.343(0.211)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.002(0.004)*** 0.001(0.001)
Percent Poverty -0.036(0.021) -0.019(0.025)
Violent Crime Rate 0.010(0.003)** 0.011(0.004)**





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(9) = 395.85 Wald χ13 = 403.63
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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Table A.3 ZIP Regression, General Threat model
Count Model Zero-Inflation model
Percent Non-White 0.079(0.023)** -0.013(0.011)
Percent Non-White2 -0.001(0.000)*** 0.000(0.000)
South -0.161(0.268) -0.527(0.170)**
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.002(0.000)*** -0.001(0.001)
Percent Poverty -0.038(0.024) 0.015(0.013)
Violent Crime Rate 0.009(0.004)* -0.006(0.003)




N 2,135 (814 zeros)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(9) = 263.99 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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Table A.4 ZIP Regression, Specific Threat model
Count Model Zero-Inflation model
Percent Black 0.003(0.018) 0.010(0.014)
Percent Black2 -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000)
Percent Latino/a 0.066(0.020)** -0.005(0.012)
Percent Latino/a2 -0.001(0.000)*** 0.000(0.000)
Percent Asian 0.105(0.063) 0.001(0.032)
Percent Asian2 -0.003(0.003) -0.000(0.001)
South 0.166(0.194) -0.707(0.182)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.001)* -0.001(0.001)
Percent Poverty -0.023(0.026) 0.012(0.013)
Violent Crime Rate 0.010(0.004)* -0.009(0.004)*




N 2,135 (814 zeros)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(13) = 330.19 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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Table A.5 Hurdle Regression, General Threat model
Regression Model Selection model
Percent Non-White 0.052(0.017)** 0.009(0.007)
Percent Non-White2 -0.001(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)
South 0.587(0.227)* 0.324(0.104)**
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.001)*** 0.000(0.001)
Percent Poverty 0.027(0.020) -0.009(0.008)
Violent Crime Rate 0.008(0.004) 0.004(0.002)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(9) = 75.29 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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Table A.6 Hurdle Regression, Specific Threat model
Regression Model Selection model
Percent Black 0.041(0.019)* -0.006(0.009)
Percent Black2 -0.001(0.000)** -0.000(0.000)
Percent Latino/a 0.023(0.018) 0.003(0.007)
Percent Latino/a2 -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000)
Percent Asian 0.049(0.052) 0.001(0.020)
Percent Asian2 -0.001(0.001) -0.000(0.000)
South 0.644(0.253)* 0.431(0.110)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.004(0.001)** 0.000(0.001)
Percent Poverty 0.030(0.019) -0.007(0.008)
Violent Crime Rate 0.011(0.005)* 0.005(0.002)*





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(13) = 90.90 Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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Table A.7 OLS Regressions, General and Specific Threat models
General Threat model Specific Threat model
Percent Non-White 1.749(0.737)* -
Percent Non-White2 -0.015(0.006)** -
Percent Black - -0.397(0.528)
Percent Black2 - 0.005(0.010)
Percent Latino/a - 1.905(0.933)*
Percent Latino/a2 - -0.020(0.009)*
Percent Asian - 3.526(2.592)
Percent Asian2 - -0.084(0.060)
South 0.322(9.448) 10.332(7.046)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.405(0.125)** 0.355(0.132)**
Percent Poverty -0.728(0.603) -0.233(0.531)
Violent Crime Rate 0.213(0.110) 0.307(0.141)*





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
R2 0.091 0.098
F(9, 598) = 6.06 F(13, 598) = 4.38
Prob. > F = 0.000 Prob. > F = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000s)
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ALTERNATIVE DV TRANSFORMATIONS
Table A.8 Logit with binary militarization dependent variable
General Threat model Specific Threat model
Percent Non-White 0.013(0.011) -
Percent Non-White2 -0.000(0.000) -
Percent Black - -0.010(0.014)
Percent Black2 - -0.000(0.000)
Percent Latino/a - 0.005(0.012)
Percent Latino/a2 - -0.000(0.000)
Percent Asian - -0.001(0.032)
Percent Asian2 - 0.000(0.001)
South 0.527(0.170)** 0.707(0.182)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001)
Percent Poverty -0.015(0.013) -0.012(0.013)
Violent Crime Rate 0.006(0.003) 0.009(0.004)*





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2 (9) 26.25 (13) 30.98
Prob. > χ2 0.001 0.003
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.026
DV = Militarization (0=0, >0=1)
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Table A.9 OLS Regressions with logged militarization dependent variable
General Threat model Specific Threat model
Percent Non-White 0.066(0.031)* -
Percent Non-White2 -0.001(0.000)* -
Percent Black - -0.001(0.040)
Percent Black2 - -0.001(0.001)
Percent Latino/a - 0.025(0.032)
Percent Latino/a2 - -0.000(0.000)
Percent Asian - 0.046(0.091)
Percent Asian2 - -0.001(0.002)
South 1.709(0.464)*** 2.201(0.486)***
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.003) 0.005(0.003)
Percent Poverty -0.023(0.034) -0.012(0.034)
Violent Crime Rate 0.021(0.009)* 0.028(0.010)**





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
R2 = 0.093 R2 = 0.061
F(9, 598) = 8.20 F(13, 598) = 5.05
Prob. > F = 0.000 Prob. > F = 0.000
DV = log(Militarization)
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Population (divided by 10,000) -0.053(0.013)***
Percent Poverty -0.120(0.037)**
Violent Crime Rate 0.149(0.049)**






∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(9) = 952.67
Prob. > χ2 0.000
DV = Number of SWAT deployments in 2014
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4
B.1 ALTERNATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARIZATION
Some may object to measuring militarization by simply dividing the cumulative dollar
amount of 1033 program equipment by 10,000. It is plausible that a log transformation
would be preferable for this variable. I include the same zero-inflated negative binomial
model, but with militarization measured by the natural log of the inflation-adjusted dollar
value of military hardware received by the agency in each year, plus one1. Results of this
model are in Table B.1. Most importantly, militarization remains positive and significant
(p < 0.05) in the count model. However, militarization does not achieve significance in
the zero-inflation model.
Additionally, while I argue that the inflation-adjusted dollar value of equipment an
agency receives through the 1033 program represents varying levels of militarization (in
other words, police departments who become more collectively militarized will desire and
request more expensive equipment), it is also plausible that more militarized departments
will simply request more equip-ment in general. Thus, the value of the equipment is less im-
portant, especially considering the average officer is much less likely to use more expensive
equipment. For example, while police departments may obtain mine-resistant, ambush-
protected vehicles, or MRAPs, which are worth approximately $600,000, the likelihood
1I add one to all totals because many of the observations for this variable are zeros, and the natural log
of a zero is undefined. When dealing with such large dollar amounts, a single dollar makes little substantive
difference and allows me to take the natural log of all observations. Additionally, adding one to the entire
vector does not change the fundamental pattern of the vector.
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of the average officer being able to use such a vehicle is probably very low. On the other
hand, the average officer may be much more likely to use lower-valued equipment such as
helmets, body armor, boots, weapons, etc. Thus, I run additional models with militariza-
tion represented by the total number of items (lagged by one quarter) an agency re-ceived
through the 1033 program, a binary variable indicating whether an agency received an item
worth $50,000 or more, and a binary variable indicating whether an agency received an
item worth $100,000 or more2.
The results of these models are in Tables B.2, B.3, and B.4, respectively. In Table B.2,
the total number of items received is not significant in the countmodel but has a negative and
significant (p < 0.05) association in the zero-inflation model. This suggests that agencies
that receive more items are less likely to kill zero suspects in a quarter, but total items
have no effect on the total number of suspects killed. In Table B.3, receiving at least one
item valued at $50,000 or more has a positive and significant (p < 0.05) association with
the number of suspects killed, but not in the zero-inflation model. Finally, in Table B.4,
receiving at least one item valued at $100,000 or more is also positive and significantly
(p < 0.001) associated with higher numbers of suspect deaths, but not in the zero-inflation
model.
Tables B.5 and B.6 combine these two alternative measures. In Table B.5, I include both
the total number of items received and the binary variable indicating whether an agency re-
ceived an item valued at $50,000 or more. In Table B.6, I include the total number of items
and whether an agency received an item valued at $100,000 or more. In both tables, the
high-value item variable is significant and positive in the count model (p < 0.01 in Table
B.5, p < 0.001) in Table B.6), while the total number of items is not significant. Neither
variable is significant in the zero-inflation model of Table B.5, but both the $100,000 indi-
cator and the total number of items are significant in the zero-inflation model of Table B.6
2$50,000 and $100,000 represent roughly the top 5% and the top 2% of items in the raw 1033 program
data by inflation-adjusted value.
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(p < 0.001 and p < 0.05, respectively).
Table B.7 depicts the results of another alternative measure of militarization. In this
model, I use a binary variable from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Admin-
istrative Statistics that indicates whether a police department has a team that engages in
“tactical operations”–in other words, whether the department has a Special Response Team
(also know as a Special Weapons and Tactics or SWAT team). This measure is closer to the
definition of militarization according to Kraska and others. However, the results suggest
that the presence of one of these teams in a department is not significantly related to suspect
deaths.
Taken together, the results of these models seem to suggest that dollar values–and par-
ticularly, higher valued items, are capturing an effect that a simple count of items does not.
The results contribute further support to my argument that the dollar value acts as a better
proxy for militarization than other potential measures despite the fact that many officers
within a department may not directly use or interact with some items the agency receives.
B.2 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
As robustness checks, I also estimate several additional statistical models using the data
from the main analysis. Table B.8 depicts the results of a negative binomial regression.
This result adds further support to the results of the main analysis, as militarization has a
positive and significant (p < 0.01) association with suspect deaths. While the likelihood
ratio test of alpha in the zero-inflated negative binomial and the negative binomial models
show overdispersion in the dependent variable (p < 0.001), which leads to the conclusion
that negative binomial models are more appropriate for the data than Poisson models, I run
a zero-inflated Poisson regression and a Poisson regression for further robustness checks.
These results are inTables B.9 andB.10, respectively. Themilitarization variable just barely
fails to achieve significance in the zero-inflated Poissonmodel (p = 0.056) but is significant
and positive in the Poisson regression model (p < 0.001).
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I also run OLS regressions with two-way random effects (Table B.11) and with stan-
dard errors clustered by agency (Table B.12). The results of the random effects regression
support the main analysis, as militarization is again positive and significant (p < 0.001). In
the OLS model with clustered standard errors, militarization again barely fails significant
(p = 0 : 053). While these models are not necessarily appropriate for the data, they can
serve as additional robustness checks to show that the results hold across several model
specifications.
B.3 ENDOGENEITY
One major issue with this analysis is the potential for an endogenous relationship be-
tween militarization and the use of lethal force. It is possible that a higher frequency of
suspect deaths could drive militarization as a response to fear of retaliation or simply due
to the expectation of violent encounters in the future. Then, militarization may lead to an
increase in the killing of suspects, creating a sort of feedback loop. An endogenous rela-
tionship such as this would call all of the previous results into question.
I ran all of the previous models with the militarization variable lagged by one quarter
as an attempt to compensate for endogeneity, but further effort seems necessary in order to
determinewhether it is present. To test for endogeneity, I ranmodels using themilitarization
variable from the main analysis as the dependent variable. The level of analysis remains the
agency-quarter. As explanatory variables, I use the number of people police in a particular
agency killed in a particular quarter, which I lagged by one quarter, as well as all control
variables from the main analysis. Table B.13 shows the results of an OLS regression with
standard errors clustered by agency. Most importantly, these results indicate that the lagged
number of deaths has no statistically significant effect on militarization.
To further test the possibility of endogeneity, I also estimated a regression with agency
and time random effects in order to better account for unobserved effects that are due to
agency-specific or time-specific factors. Results of this model are in Table B.14. These re-
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sults also show that the number of deaths has no significant effect on future militarization.
Taken together, these two additional models suggest rejecting the potential of an endoge-
neous relationship between the use of lethal force and militarization.
B.4 ALTERNATIVE TIME SCALE
Finally, the main analysis uses quarterly data as it is the most disaggregated data avail-
able on both militarization and incidents of suspect deaths. This may lead to the potential
for bias if there is little variation in either variable from quarter to quarter. In addition, the
control variables do not change from quarter to quarter. In order to test for bias introduced
by using quarterly data, I aggregated the data to agency-year observations, using the aver-
age level of militarization (lagged by one year) and the total number of suspect deaths for
each year. These results are in Table B.15. Most importantly, militarization is positive and
significant in its association with suspect deaths (p < 0.001).
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B.5 APPENDIX B TABLES
B.5.1 ALTERNATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARIZATION
Table B.1 ZINB Regression with natural log of militarization
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Log Militarization (lagged) 0.090(0.040)* -0.011(0.066)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)* -0.213(0.063)***
Percent Poverty 0.004(0.017) -0.006(0.022)
Percent Latino/a 0.013(0.009) 0.008(0.013)
Percent Black 0.004(0.005) -0.002(0.007)
Violent Crime Rate 0.020(0.008)* 0.007(0.014)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 213.85 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.2 ZINB Regression with the total number of items received
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Total Items Received (lagged) 0.000(0.000) -0.007(0.003)*
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)* -0.208(0.046)***
Percent Poverty 0.005(0.016) -0.004(0.021)
Percent Latino/a 0.013(0.008) 0.007(0.010)
Percent Black 0.004(0.006) -0.003(0.008)
Violent Crime Rate 0.025(0.009)** 0.014(0.015)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 190.53 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.3 ZINB Regression, received high value item as militarization
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Received High-Value Item (above $50k, lagged) 0.404(0.158)* 0.211(0.265)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)* -0.220(0.055)***
Percent Poverty 0.004(0.016) -0.006(0.021)
Percent Latino/a 0.011(0.008) 0.006(0.011)
Percent Black 0.004(0.005) -0.002(0.008)
Violent Crime Rate 0.020(0.009)* 0.005(0.014)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 183.63 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.4 ZINB Regression, received high-value item (alternative level) as
militarization
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Received High-Value Item (above $100k, lagged) 0.601(0.158)*** 0.291(0.305)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)** -0.216(0.035)***
Percent Poverty 0.010(0.015) 0.001(0.019)
Percent Latino/a 0.012(0.006)* 0.008(0.009)
Percent Black 0.002(0.005) -0.005(0.007)
Violent Crime Rate 0.021(0.007)** 0.007(0.013)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 236.64 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.5 ZINB Regression with the total number of items received and a high-value
item dummy variable
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Total Items Received (lagged) -0.000(0.000) -0.007(0.004)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)* -0.213(0.046)***
Percent Poverty 0.007(0.017) -0.001(0.022)
Percent Latino/a 0.012(0.008) 0.007(0.010)
Percent Black 0.004(0.006) -0.003(0.008)
Violent Crime Rate 0.021(0.008)* 0.012(0.015)
Budget per Officer (divided by 10,000) -0.000(0.016) -0.019(0.036)
Countywide -1.563(0.217)*** -0.824(0.448)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 201.36 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.6 ZINB Regression with the total number of items received and an alternate
high-value item dummy variable
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Total Items Received (lagged) -0.000(0.000) -0.007(0.003)*
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002)** -0.211(0.030)***
Percent Poverty 0.013(0.015) 0.006(0.020)
Percent Latino/a 0.012(0.006)* 0.008(0.008)
Percent Black 0.002(0.005) -0.006(0.008)
Violent Crime Rate 0.021(0.007)** 0.013(0.014)
Budget per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.003(0.012) -0.015(0.022)
Countywide -1.586(0.195)*** -0.845(0.397)*




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 249.29 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.7 ZINB Regression with SWAT team dummy variable
Count model Zero-Inflation model
SWAT Team 0.726(0.462) -0.317(0.433)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.005(0.002))** -0.186(0.045)***
Percent Poverty 0.004(0.016) -0.008(0.021)
Percent Latino/a 0.012(0.007) 0.005(0.010)
Percent Black 0.004(0.006) -0.001(0.007)
Violent Crime Rate 0.021(0.008)** 0.003(0.012)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 146.78 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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B.5.2 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Table B.8 NB Regression, effect of militarization on civilian deaths
Estimate
Militarization (lagged, divided by 10,000) 0.003(0.001)**




Violent Crime Rate 0.003(0.007)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 91.37 Prob. > chi2 = 0.014
Pseudo R2 0.139
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.9 ZIP Regression, effect of militarization on civilian deaths
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Militarization (lagged, divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.000) -0.002(0.002)
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.004(0.001)*** -0.172(0.214)***
Percent Poverty -0.001(0.015) -0.012(0.019)
Percent Latino/a 0.015(0.004)** 0.011(0.006)
Percent Black 0.005(0.005) -0.001(0.007)
Violent Crime Rate 0.018(0.009) 0.003(0.013)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 330.38 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.10 Poisson Regression, effect of militarization on civilian deaths
Estimate
Militarization (lagged, divided by 10,000) 0.002(0.001)***




Violent Crime Rate -0.007(0.010)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2 = 187.66 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.192
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.11 Regression with two-way random effects, effect of militarization on civilian
deaths
Estimate
Militarization (lagged, divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.000)***




Violent Crime Rate 0.001(0.001)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
R2 0.295
Wald chi2 = 1466.52 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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Table B.12 OLS Regression, effect of militarization on civilian deaths
Estimate




Percent Black (not Hispanic) -0.000(0.000)
Violent Crime Rate 0.001(0.001)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
R2 0.295
F = 11.18 Prob. > F = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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B.5.3 ENDOGENEITY
Table B.13 OLS Regression, effect of civilian deaths on future militarization
Estimate
Deaths (lagged) 21.599(13.095)




Violent Crime Rate 0.739(0.180)***




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
R2 0.158
F = 6.36 Prob. > F = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000 2016 dollars)
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Violent Crime Rate 0.714(0.171)***




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
R2 0.137
Wald chi2 = 251.68 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Militarization (in 10,000 2016 dollars)
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B.5.4 ALTERNATIVE TIME SCALE
Table B.15 ZINB Regression with annual averages
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Militarization (lagged, divided by 10,000) 0.011(0.002)*** 0.007(0.003)*
Population (divided by 10,000) 0.013(0.004)*** -0.576(0.114)***
Percent Poverty 0.015(0.015) 0.002(0.027)
Percent Latino/a 0.003(0.004) -0.007(0.008)
Percent Black (not Hispanic) 0.002(0.005) -0.002(0.010)
Violent Crime Rate 0.027(0.009)** 0.008(0.016)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald chi2(8) = 88.35 Prob. > chi2 = 0.000
DV = Number of suspect deaths
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 5
C.1 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS - HYPOTHESIS 1
This section discusses the results of alternative model specifications relating to Hypoth-
esis 1, which examine the effect of civilian deaths on the probability that a police department
applied for or received a BWCPIP grant in 2015. Although the ρ parameter in the Heckman
probit model is significant, suggesting the presence of a selection effect and, therefore, the
necessity of using a sample-selection model, I performed robustness checks in the form
of separating the Heckman model into separate constituent models. The results of these
models are in Tables C.1 through C.7.
Table C.1 displays the results of a scobit regression including only police departments
that applied for a grant. The dependent variable is a binary variable where 1 indicates
the police department received a grant, 0 otherwise. This variable is skewed, with only
36 police departments in the sample receiving a grant. A scobit relaxes the assumption
that independent variable effects are strongest at a probability of 0.5, so the results of this
model could help support the ultimate conclusion of the main analysis. The results indicate
that they do. I find a positive, significant (P < 0.001) association between the number of
civilian deaths in 2014 and the probability of a police department receiving a grant. Tables
C.2 andC.3 show the results of a logit and probit analysis, respectively, of the same variables
and observations. These models also support the substantive finding of the main analysis
with regard to civilian deaths: they show a positive and significant (p < 0.01) association
between the number of deaths in 2014 and the probability of a police department receiving
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a grant.
Tables C.4 and C.5 repeat the analysis as logit and probit models, respectively, including
censored observations as well as uncensored. These models also support the substantive
findings. The models show a positive association between the number of civilian deaths
in 2014 and the probability of a police department receiving a grant. In each model, the
number of deaths is statistically significant (p < 0.01, p < 0.001, respectively). Civilian
deaths seem to have a positive impact on the probability of receiving a grant, given the
positive and significant associations across multiple model specifications.
Finally, Tables C.6 and C.7 depict the results of alternate specifications of the selection
model from the main analysis, measuring the effect of the independent variables on the
probability that a police department applied for a BWCPIP grant. In each, I find a positive
and significant (p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively) association between 2014 deaths and the
probability of applying for a grant. These models seem to offer support for the substantive
findings of the selection model. Overall, these alternative models support the substantive
findings of the main analysis.
C.2 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS - HYPOTHESIS 2
This section discusses the results of alternative model specifications that test Hypothesis
2. This hypothesis predicted that police departments that received a grant would kill fewer
civilians in the following year. In the main analysis, the results suggest the opposite: I
find that police departments that received a BWCPIP grant killed more people in 2016 than
departments that did not receive a grant. As the dependent variable is an event count, I ran
a series of alternative event count models as robustness checks. Tables C.8 and C.10 depict
Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson regressions, respectively. In these models, receiving a
grant had no significant effect on the number of deaths in the following year.
However, the significance of the alpha parameter in the main analysis suggests that the
dependent variable is over-dispersed, which could explain the lack of significant findings
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in Poisson models. I also estimated a zero-inflated Negative Binomial regression model as
an additional check. The results of this model offer support for the substantive findings of
the main analysis: I find a positive, significant (p < 0.05) association between receiving
a grant and the number of future deaths. Though this result does not support the initial
hypothesis, it does offer support for the contradictory finding.
Finally, Tables C.11 and C.12 estimate Negative Binomial and Poisson models, respec-
tively, that replicate the model in the main analysis but only include the observations of
police departments that applied for a grant. The results also support the findings of the
main analysis. In each model, there is a positive and significant (p < 0.01, p < 0.001, re-
spectively) association between receiving a grant and the number of future civilian deaths.
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C.3 APPENDIX C TABLES
C.3.1 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS - HYPOTHESIS 1




2014 Population (divided by 10,000) -0.002(0.002)
Percent Black (2014) -0.026(0.011)*
Percent Latino/a (2014) -0.018(0.013)
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.015(0.043)
Current Body Camera Program -0.537(0.437)
Dash Cameras 0.902(0.778)
Countywide -1.376(1.171)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
DV =Whether department received grant
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2014 Population (divided by 10,000) -0.002(0.002)
Percent Black (2014) -0.031(0.014)*
Percent Latino/a (2014) -0.022(0.016)
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.006(0.046)
Current Body Camera Program -0.701(0.554)
Dash Cameras 0.924(0.851)
Countywide -1.500(1.320)
Amount Requested (logged) 0.302(0.213)
(Intercept) -4.292(2.731)
N 113
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(8) = 20.71
Prob. > χ2 = 0.014
DV =Whether department received a grant
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2014 Population (divided by 10,000) -0.001(0.001)
Percent Black (2014) -0.018(0.008)*
Percent Latino/a (2014) -0.013(0.009)
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.000(0.025)
Current Body Camera Program -0.416(0.328)
Dash Cameras 0.466(0.439)
Countywide -0.743(0.670)
Amount Requested (logged) 0.177(0.123)
(Intercept) -2.423(1.540)
N 113
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(8) = 23.58
Prob. > χ2 = 0.005
DV =Whether department received a grant
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2014 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.003(0.001)*
Percent Black (2014) 0.020(0.006)***
Percent Latino/a (2014) 0.011(0.007)
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.036(0.010)***





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(8) = 59.32
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV =Whether department received a grant
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2014 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.001)*
Percent Black (2014) 0.010(0.003)***
Percent Latino/a (2014) 0.004(0.003)
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.017(0.006)**





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(8) = 60.42
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV =Whether department received a grant
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Table C.6 Logit Regression, effect of deaths on probability of applying for grant
Estimate
2014 Deaths 0.133(0.059)*
2014 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.004(0.001)**
Percent Black (2014) 0.033(0.005)***
Percent Latino/a (2014) 0.017(0.004)***
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.039(0.013)**





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 111.26
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV =Whether department applied for grant
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Table C.7 Probit Regression, effect of deaths on probability of applying for grant
Estimate
2014 Deaths 0.078(0.029)**
2014 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.002(0.001)*
Percent Black (2014) 0.017(0.002)***
Percent Latino/a (2014) 0.008(0.002)***
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.021(0.006)***





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 115.81
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV =Whether department applied for grant
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C.3.2 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS - HYPOTHESIS 2




2015 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.002(0.001)*
Percent Black (2015) 0.021(0.003)***
Percent Latino/a (2015) 0.017(0.002)***




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 339.24
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Number of deaths in 2016
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Table C.9 ZINB Regression, effect of receiving grant on future deaths
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Awarded Grant 0.550(0.242)* 0.532(1.091)
2015 Deaths 0.268(0.043)*** -1.025(0.355)**
2015 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.001(0.001) -0.379(0.093)***
Percent Black (2015) 0.004(0.004) -0.024(0.009)**
Percent Latino/a (2015) -0.002(0.004) -0.026(0.015)




N 2,189 (1,863 zeros)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 78.25
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Number of deaths in 2016
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Table C.10 ZIP Regression, effect of receiving grant on future deaths
Count model Zero-Inflation model
Awarded Grant 0.339(0.291) -0.327(0.847)
2015 Deaths 0.101(0.012)*** -1.122(0.309)***
2015 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.000(0.001) -0.171(0.068)*
Percent Black (2015) 0.003(0.004) -0.018(0.007)*
Percent Latino/a (2015) -0.000(0.004) -0.018(0.009)
Budget Per Officer (divided by 10,000) 0.010(0.007) -0.014(0.012)
Countywide -0.771(0.237)** 1.164(0.459)*
(Intercept) -0.124(0.199) 3.167(0.309)***
N 2,189 (1,863 zeros)
∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 131.85
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Number of deaths in 2016
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2015 Population (divided by 10,000) -0.001(0.002)
Percent Black (2015) 0.013(0.007)*
Percent Latino/a (2015) 0.007(0.007)





∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 41.65
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Number of deaths in 2016
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2015 Population (divided by 10,000) 0.000(0.002)
Percent Black (2015) 0.013(0.007)
Percent Latino/a (2015) 0.013(0.008)




∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Wald χ2(7) = 108.21
Prob. > χ2 = 0.000
DV = Number of deaths in 2016
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